

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN)
MARIANA ISLANDS,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
OSCAR REYES BABAUTA,)
)
Defendant.)
_____)

Criminal Case No. 97-0031

ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter came before the court for a motions hearing on June 14, 2000, in Courtroom 223A at 9:00 a.m. Assistant Attorney General James J. Benedetto, Esq., appeared on behalf of the Commonwealth. Assistant Attorney General Robert Goldberg, Esq., appeared on behalf of Assistant Attorney General James J. Benedetto, Esq., for the limited purpose of responding to Defendant's motion for sanctions. Theodore R. Mitchell, Esq., and Jeanne H. Rayphand, Esq., appeared on behalf of the Defendant, Oscar Reyes Babauta. The court, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and being fully informed of the premises, now renders its written decision.

II. FACTS

On February 1, 1997, Defendant allegedly drove up next to a van driven by the victim, shouted obscenities, then shot the victim in the head with a rifle. Defendant was arrested and charged with murder in the first degree, in violation of 6 CMC § 1101(a) and made punishable by 6 CMC § 1101(c). [p. 2]

Defendant gave notice, as required, that he intends to present a temporary insanity defense and that Dr. Robert L. Sadoff (Dr. Sadoff) would be the defense expert hired to examine Defendant.

On March 23, 1998, the Commonwealth moved the court to appoint a qualified psychiatrist pursuant to 6 CMC § 6604(a) and to require that Defendant submit to a mental examination pursuant to 6 CMC § 6604(c).

FOR PUBLICATION

On July 27, 1998, the court entered an order providing that:

(1) Dr. Marvit [the court's psychiatric expert] shall transfer custody of all taped interviews of Defendant to the Court. Copies of the tapes shall be made available to both the Government and Defendant's expert.

(2) Dr. Kiffer [the Commonwealth's psychiatric expert] shall examine the Defendant without the presence of counsel. Defendant's representative may tape Defendant's interview.

(3) The names and addresses of persons interviewed by Dr. Sadoff [Defendant's psychiatric expert] shall not be disclosed. **Dr. Sadoff shall provide to the Government any written report of his examination.**

See Commonwealth v. Babauta, Crim. Case No. 97-0031 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. July 27, 1998) (Order)(emphasis added).

On April 4, 2000, a hearing was held in which counsel for the Commonwealth informed the court that no written report had been received from defense counsel.

On April 10, the court ordered "that the [Commonwealth's] request for the defense counsel to provide the report of Dr. Robert L. Sadoff is granted." *See Commonwealth v. Babauta*, Crim. Case No. 97-0031 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2000) (Order).

On April 24, 2000, Defendant filed a motion to preclude the testimony of Dr. Sadoff, or alternatively to require that the defense expert submit to a deposition.

On May 3, 2000, the Commonwealth filed a motion for protective order regarding character evidence, seeking an order of the court "prohibiting defense counsel from mentioning, at any time during the trial, including but not limited to *voir dire*, opening statement or closing argument, any character evidence concerning the victim, Jose Boki Babauta, or from asking any question intended to elicit from any witness any character evidence concerning the victim." [p. 3]

On May 5, 2000, Defendant filed an opposition asserting that Dr. Sadoff has not made a written report and therefore no report has been given to the Commonwealth.

On May 11, 2000, the court granted the Commonwealth's motion to compel Dr. Sadoff to submit to a deposition.

On June 7, 2000, Defendant filed the following motions: (1) a motion for reconsideration of the court's orders issued on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000; (2) a motion for protective order preventing the Commonwealth from circulating the deposition transcript; (3) a

motion to attend the taking of the deposition of Defendant's expert and for expenses; (4) a motion to require the Commonwealth to pay defense expert's fee for deposition preparation and testimony; (5) a motion for sanctions against Assistant Attorney General James J. Benedetto; (6) a motion to strike the Commonwealth's renewed motion to preclude defense expert's testimony; and (7) a motion to strike the Commonwealth's motion for protective order.

III. ISSUES

1. Whether the court shall grant Defendant's motion for reconsideration of the court's orders dated July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, on the ground that the Commonwealth is not entitled to a written report prepared by Dr. Robert L. Sadoff under the reciprocal discovery provisions of Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B).

2. Whether the court shall grant Defendant's motion for sanctions against Assistant Attorney General James J. Benedetto, Esq., for allegedly misrepresenting to the court that defense counsel failed to comply with the court's discovery orders and for allegedly citing "misleading" and "irrelevant" case law in court pleadings.

3. Whether the court shall grant Defendant's motion to strike the Commonwealth's motion for a protective order regarding character evidence on the ground that it was untimely filed.

4. Whether the court shall grant the Commonwealth's motion for a protective order prohibiting the introduction of evidence relating to the victim's character. [p. 4]

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Orders Dated July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000.

On March 15, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Orders Dated July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000. Defendant makes two arguments for the reconsideration of the court's orders relating to the examination of Defendant by Dr. Sadoff,

Defendant's expert witness. First, Defendant contends that the court's orders issued on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, erroneously found that the Commonwealth is entitled to a written report prepared by Dr. Sadoff under the reciprocal discovery provisions of Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B). Second, Defendant contends that no legal basis exists for the court's order granting the Commonwealth's motion to compel Dr. Sadoff to submit to a deposition because a defense expert cannot be forced to submit to a deposition under Com. R. Crim. P. 15(a) if the expert is available to testify at trial.

1. Reconsideration of Orders Requiring Reciprocal Discovery Pursuant to Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B).

Defendant asks the court to reconsider its orders entered on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, in which the court found that the Commonwealth was entitled to the production of a written report outlining Dr. Sadoff's expected testimony. Defendant asserts that no legal basis for such a finding was given and that Defendant is only required to provide such a report if the Defendant requested and received discovery from the Commonwealth under Com. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) or (D).

Pursuant to Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B):

If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request of the government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examination and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial or which are prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to his testimony. **[p. 5]**

Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B). The Commonwealth alleges that on February 24, 1998, counsel for Defendant made a request for production of photographs pursuant to Com. R. Cr. P. 16(a)(1)(C), which states that "[u]pon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies of portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the government." See Com. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C). The Commonwealth contends that such request triggered the reciprocal discovery obligations of Com. R. Cr. P. 16(b)(1)(B), thus entitling the

Commonwealth to production of a report prepared by Dr. Sadoff relating to his examination of Defendant.

a. Compliance with Rule 16(a)(1)(C) Request for Discovery.

A prerequisite to any obligation of Defendant to provide discovery pursuant to Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(B) is that Defendant first requested discovery from the Commonwealth pursuant to Com. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(1)(C) or (D). The Commonwealth asserts that on February 24, 1998, defense counsel made a request for discovery pursuant to Com. R. Cr. P. 16(a)(1)(C). In particular, the Commonwealth contends that “Mr. Mitchell specifically requested to inspect and make arrangement to reproduce in[sic] and all photographs in the prosecution files . . .” *See Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration*, at 5. This request, however, was not complied with until June 16, 2000, at which time the Commonwealth sent a letter referencing the provision of forty-one (41) “colored copy of photos.” *See Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration*, Exhibit A.

A defendant’s reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 16(b) do not arise unless and until the government has complied with its obligations under Rule 16(a). *See Com. R. Crim. P. 16(b)*, *see also United States v. Kraselnick*, 702 F.Supp 480, 487 (D.N.J. 1988). Accordingly, Defendant’s reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 16(b) did not arise until the Commonwealth produced the photographs on June 16, 2000, and the court’s orders entered on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, were premature in ordering Defendant to produce reciprocal discovery before compliance with Defendant’s discovery request. As such, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s orders entered on July 27, 1998, April 10, [p. 6] 2000, and May 11, 2000, is **GRANTED**. Accordingly, those portions of the orders which require the production of a report prepared by Dr. Sadoff are hereby vacated.

b. Present Reciprocal Discovery Obligation Considering Recent Compliance with Discovery Request.

If no written report is prepared by an expert witness, no reciprocal discovery obligation is incurred under Rule 16. *See United States v. Peters*, 937 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[w]hile the language ‘results or reports’ . . . arguably could apply to an expert’s opinion which has not been recorded in some tangible medium, other language in both rules clearly demonstrates that the rules

refer only to information recorded in some tangible form”), *see also United States v. Shue*, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) (the language of Rule 16 suggests that it refers only to written reports); *United States v. Johnson*, 713 F.2d 654, 659 (11th Cir. 1983), *cert. denied* 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (where no report was prepared by expert, no discovery obligation incurred under Rule 16); *State v. Genotti*, 601 A.2d 1013, 1019 (Conn. 1992) (defendant was not obligated to disclose to the state the expert witness’ unrecorded observations and conclusions).

In the present matter, defense counsel has repeatedly insisted that Dr. Sadoff did not prepare a written report. *See* Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit F (Declaration of Theodore R. Mitchell, Esq.). As such, the court finds no reciprocal discovery obligation has been incurred, despite the fact that the Commonwealth has now complied with Defendant’s discovery request.

The court notes, however, that although Defendant’s reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 16(b) did not arise until the Commonwealth produced the photographs on June 16, 2000, Defendant now has an obligation to produce a “written report” if such report exists. Failure to produce such a report or deliberately instructing an expert not to prepare a written report to avoid reciprocal discovery obligations is sanctionable conduct. *In re Serra*, 484 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1973) (defense counsel’s instruction to expert witness not to prepare report in order to avoid reciprocal discovery obligation was clear and deliberate attempt to frustrate the court’s discovery order).

[p. 7] 2. Propriety of Order Compelling Expert Witness to Submit to Deposition when Expert is Available to Testify at Trial.

Defendant contends that no legal basis exists for the court’s order entered on May 11, 2000, granting the Commonwealth’s motion to compel Dr. Sadoff to submit to a deposition because a defense expert cannot be forced to submit to a deposition under Com. R. Crim. P. 15(a) unless the witness is “unavailable” to testify at trial.

Pursuant to Com. R. Crim. P. 15(a):

Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved for use at trial, the court may . . . order that the testimony of such witness be taken by deposition . . .

Com. R. Crim. P. 15(a). It is appropriate to consult interpretations of counterpart federal rules when interpreting Commonwealth procedural rules. *Mafnas v. Commonwealth*, 2 N.M.I. 248, 264 (1991).

The use of depositions is generally disfavored in criminal cases. *United States v. Drogoul*, 1 F.3d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1993). Rule 15 depositions “are not allowed merely for the purpose of discovery.” *United States v. Cutler*, 806 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1986), citing *United States v. Rich*, 580 F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 330, 58 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). “A defendant may depose a witness only if the witness may be unable to attend trial.” *Rich, supra* at 934.

In the present matter it is anticipated and expected that Dr. Sadoff will be available to testify at trial. The court finds, therefore, that Defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Sadoff, cannot be forced to submit to a deposition under Com. R. Crim. P. 15(a). Also, Dr. Sadoff is an adverse witness and “[Rule 15] contemplates a party taking the deposition of only his own witness.” *Id.* Accordingly, that portion of the court’s order entered on May 11, 2000, requiring Dr. Sadoff to submit to a deposition is hereby vacated.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions.

Defense counsel asks the court to exercise its inherent power to sanction Assistant Attorney General James Benedetto, Esq., (Assistant Attorney General Benedetto) in the amount of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) for allegedly misrepresenting to the court that defense counsel failed to comply with the court’s orders entered on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, and for citing “misleading” and [p. 8] “irrelevant” case law in court pleadings. First, defense counsel asserts that Assistant Attorney General Benedetto repeatedly misrepresented to the court that defense counsel violated the court’s order to produce a report prepared by the defense expert, Dr. Sadoff. Second, defense counsel asserts that Assistant Attorney General Benedetto misled the court by citing three “misleading” and “irrelevant” cases. Defense counsel contends the three citations were “irrelevant” and “misleading” because they dealt with instances in which a court allowed the prosecution to take the deposition of their own witnesses under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a) despite the fact that the present matter involves an effort to take the deposition of an “adverse witness.”

A court should not exercise its inherent power to assess monetary sanctions against counsel absent grossly negligent, reckless, or willful conduct. *Commonwealth v. Borja*, 3 N.M.I. 156, 175

(1992), citing *Zambrano v. City of Tustin*, 885 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1989). Monetary sanctions should not be imposed for mere inadvertence, mistake or error of judgment. *Zambrano*, at 1480.

First, Assistant Attorney General Benedetto made no “misrepresentation,” but rather, merely informed the court that Defense counsel has not provided the Commonwealth with a report prepared by Dr. Sadoff, despite the fact that the court ruled on April 10, 2000, that “the Government’s request for the defense counsel to provide the report of Dr. Robert L. Sadoff is granted.” See *Commonwealth v. Babauta*, Crim. Case No. 97-0031 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2000) (Order). As such, the court finds that Assistant Attorney General Benedetto’s representation that defense counsel has failed to comply with the court’s discovery orders was not grossly negligent, reckless, or willful conduct.

Second, a court, under its inherent power to promote the orderly and just administration of its case load, has the authority to impose monetary sanctions upon an attorney who deliberately misrepresents legal authority in support of a non frivolous motion. *Premier Commercial Corp. Ltd. v. FMC Corp.*, 139 F.R.D. 670 (N.D. Cal. 1991), see also *Chambers v. NASCO*, 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (court has inherent authority to impose sanctions against attorney to control its caseload). Here, however, there has been no showing that counsel deliberately misrepresented legal authority and the mere fact that the cited cases can be distinguished from the present matter is at most inadvertent error. As such, the court finds that Assistant Attorney General Benedetto’s citation to *United States v. Carrigan*, 804 F.2d 599 [p. 9] (10th Cir. 1986), *United States v. Johnson*, 752 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1985), and *United States v. Sines*, 761 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985) was not grossly negligent, reckless, or willful conduct.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for sanctions against Assistant Attorney General Benedetto is **DENIED**.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Commonwealth’s Motion for a Protective Order Regarding Character Evidence.

On March 7, 2000, in order to facilitate the orderly progression of the present matter, the court set a pretrial motions hearing for April 18, 2000.

On May 3, 2000, Defendant filed a motion for a protective order seeking to prohibit defense counsel from mentioning, at any time during the trial, any character evidence concerning the victim,

Jose Boki Babauta, or from asking any questions intended to elicit character evidence concerning the victim.

On June 7, 2000, Defendant filed a motion to strike the Commonwealth's motion for a protective order as untimely.

Pursuant to Com. R. Crim. P. 45(d), "[a] written motion . . . and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served, not later than five (5) days before the time specified for the hearing unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of the court . . ." See Com. R. Crim. P. 45(d). As such, all pretrial motions in this matter were to be filed by April 13, 2000. The Commonwealth's motion for a protective order, however, was filed on May 3, 2000. Defendant asserts that the court should not hear and consider the Commonwealth's present motion as it was untimely filed. The Commonwealth, however, argues that the court has the discretion to hear and consider the motion because it is a "motion *in limine*" and such motions are typically filed just prior to, or during trial.

"[The court] is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation, and its decisions regarding the preclusive effect of a pretrial order . . . will not be disturbed unless they evidence a clear abuse of discretion. *Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.*, 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992), citing *Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.*, 758 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1985), see also *Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc.*, 933 F.2d 341, [p. 10] 346 (5th Cir. 1991) (a court enjoys broad discretion in controlling its own docket in regard to the entertainment of substantive motions filed after pretrial deadlines).

A "motion *in limine*" is defined as a "pretrial motion requesting [the] court to prohibit opposing counsel from referring to or offering evidence on matters so highly prejudicial to [the] moving party that curative instructions cannot prevent predispositional effect on [the] jury." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (6th ed. 1990). Such pretrial motions are useful tools to resolve issues which would otherwise 'clutter up' the trial. *Palmerin v. City of Riverside*, 794 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986). "[A motion *in limine*] reduces the need for sidebar conferences and argument outside the hearing of the jury, thereby saving juror's time and eliminating distractions." *Id.* "By addressing these evidentiary issues before trial through motions *in limine*, [the court] and attorneys may be able

to given them more deliberate and careful consideration than if the issues were raised for the first time during trial. . .” *Id.*

The court finds that the Commonwealth’s motion for a protective order presents substantive issues which are best examined prior to trial. As such, Defendant’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s motion for protective order regarding character evidence is **DENIED**.

D. The Commonwealth’s Motion for a Protective Order Regarding Character Evidence.

The Commonwealth asserts that character evidence concerning the victim is irrelevant in this matter and is thus inadmissible. The Commonwealth, therefore, moves the court to enter a protective order “prohibiting defense counsel from mentioning, at any time during the trial, including but not limited to *voir dire*, opening statement or closing argument, any character evidence concerning the victim, Jose Boki Babauta, or from asking any question intended to elicit from any witness any character evidence concerning the victim.” *See Motion for Protective Order Regarding Character Evidence*, at 1.

Pursuant to Com. R. Evid. 401, “[r]elevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’ Com. R. Evid. 401. Pursuant to Com. R. Evid. 402, “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” [p. 11]

Pursuant to Com. R. Evid. 404(a):

Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.

See Com. R. Evid. 404(a). Also, pursuant to Com. R. Evid. 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith . . . [i]t may, however, be admissible for other purposes . . .” *See* Com. R. Evid. 404(b).

There are two generally recognized purposes for which evidence of character of a victim in a homicide case may be adduced. *State v. Arrasmith*, 966 P.2d 33, 41 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998). The evidence may serve to buttress a claim of self-defense and to establish that the victim was the first aggressor. *Id.* The second use of evidence of the reputation of the deceased for violence is to show the defendant's reasonable apprehension of immediate danger. *Id.*, *see also United States v. James*, 169 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1999) (corroborating evidence of victim's violence is admissible to establish defendant's credibility in self-defense claim). Here, defense counsel has filed a notice of Defendant's intention to present a temporary insanity defense. There is no foundation for the relevancy of any character evidence regarding the victim in this matter as defense counsel has never stated or intimated that any claim of self-defense will be presented. The court finds, therefore, that it is appropriate to enter a protective order prohibiting defense counsel from introducing character evidence regarding the victim. As such, the Commonwealth's motion for a protective order regarding character evidence is conditionally **GRANTED**. Accordingly, defense counsel is hereby prohibited from mentioning, at any time during the trial, including but not limited to *voir dire*, opening statement or closing argument, any character evidence concerning the victim, Jose Boki Babauta, or from asking any question intended to elicit from any witness any character evidence concerning the victim. Should defense counsel feel that character evidence concerning the victim is relevant and material at any point during the trial, defense counsel shall inform the court and opposing counsel outside the presence of the jury and the matter will be resolved *in camera*. [p. 12]

E. Alternative Theories and Remaining Defense Motions.

Given that the court has granted Defendant's motion for reconsideration, the court need not address Defendant's remaining theories and motions related to the taking of Dr. Sadoff's deposition.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for reconsideration of the court's orders entered on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, is **GRANTED**. Accordingly, those portions of the court's orders entered on July 27, 1998, April 10, 2000, and May 11, 2000, which require the production of a report prepared by Dr. Robert L. Sadoff are **VACATED**. In addition, that

portion of the court's order entered on May 11, 2000, authorizing the Commonwealth to compel Dr. Sadoff to submit to a deposition is **VACATED**.

The court reiterates, however, that although Defendant's reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 16(b) did not arise until the Commonwealth produced the photographs on June 16, 2000, Defendant now has an obligation to produce a "written report" if such report exists. Failure to produce such a report or deliberately instructing an expert not to prepare a written report to avoid reciprocal discovery obligations is sanctionable conduct. *See In re Serra*, 484 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1973).

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for sanctions against Assistant Attorney General James J. Benedetto is **DENIED**.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to strike the Commonwealth's motion for a protective order regarding character evidence for untimeliness is **DENIED**.

For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth's motion for a protective order prohibiting the introduction of evidence relating to the victim's character is conditionally **GRANTED**. Accordingly, defense counsel is hereby prohibited from mentioning, at any time during the trial, including but not limited to *voir dire*, opening statement or closing argument, any character evidence concerning the victim, Jose Boki Babauta, or from asking any question intended to elicit from any witness any character evidence concerning the victim. Should defense counsel feel that character evidence concerning the victim is relevant and material at any point during the trial, defense counsel shall inform the court and opposing counsel outside the presence of the jury and the matter will be resolved *in camera*. [p. 13]

So ORDERED this 24 day of August, 2000.

/s/ Juan T. Lizama

JUAN T. LIZAMA, Associate Judge