### FOR PUBLICATION



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# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

WU, MEI WEN,	) Civil Action No. 04-0246
Plaintiff/Appellant, v.	DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S REFUSAL OF TRANSFER RELIEF
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, acting through JOAQUIN A. TENORIO, Secretary of Labor,	) ) ) ) )
Defendant/Appellee.	) ) )

#### I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER came for decision solely on the written submissions of the parties, upon stipulation by the parties. Counsel Dorothy Hill represented Appellees, the Department of Labor (Labor) and the Secretary of Labor. Counsel Stephen Woodruff represented Appellant, Mei Wen Wu.

The above-captioned action concerns Appellant's challenge of Labor's decision to deny
Appellant employment transfer relief after she had failed to obtain a transfer permit and was
apprehended as an alleged overstaying alien. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the written
findings and legal conclusions of the Labor hearing officer, the decision of the Secretary of Labor, and

the applicable law pertaining to review of agency actions, this Court renders its decision.

This case arises out events surrounding the abandonment of Appellant by her original employer New Flying Dragon Co., Ltd. The Department of Labor opened a compliance agency case to address the abandonment of New Flying Dragon Co.'s employees, at the conclusion of which Appellant and other employees were granted 45 days to find a transfer employer. *Director of Labor v. New Flying Dragon Co., Ltd.*, C.A.C. 99-003 (Administrative Order (Sept. 10, 2001). Appellant failed to file the necessary Labor and Entry Permit Application by October 25, 2001, the approximate expiration date of the 45 day period, and the Department of Labor forwarded Appellant's name to Immigration.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant was apprehended by Immigration officers on November 25, 2002 for remaining in the Commonwealth without lawful permit. Shortly thereafter, Appellant filed a complaint with the Division of Labor. In her complaint, Appellant essentially alleged that at her original compliance hearing, Steven Pangelinan offered to employ her and assist her in completing Appellant's Labor and Entry Permit. Appellant further alleged that she paid Mr. Pangelinan \$500 to process her transfer application so Appellant could then work for Mr. Pangelinan. The Hearing Officer ruled that Appellant's claim against Pangelinan was time-barred under 4 CMC § 9246, and that Appellant was not entitled to equitable transfer relief.

On appeal, the Secretary of Labor upheld the Labor Hearing Officer's decision on the basis that the statute of limitations expressed under 4 CMC § 9246 time-barred Appellant's complaint and likewise refused to grant Appellant equitable transfer relief.

Appellant filed a Complaint for Judicial Review Filed on June 4, 2004 pursuant to 3 CMC § 4446 and the CNMI Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 1 CMC § 9112(b), wherein Appellant claims that the Secretary of Labor abused its discretion in upholding the hearing officer's denial of transfer relief. Labor and the Secretary of Labor answered Appellant's complaint on June 23 and 24, 2006,

respectively.

## III. ISSUES FOR REVIEW

- 1. Whether the Secretary of Labor abused his discretion when he limited his review of the Labor Hearing Officer's decision to the existing record without providing a written basis for exercising such discretion under 3 CMC § 4445(b)?
- 2. Whether the record contained substantial evidence to support the Secretary of Labor's denial of Appellant's request for transfer relief?

#### IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. The Secretary of Labor's Determination to Confine Review to the Existing Record Was in Accordance with 1 CMC  $\S$  9110(c).

As a preliminary matter, Appellant claims that the Secretary of Labor's review of the Labor Hearing Officer's decision fell short of statutory rights and was an abuse of discretion because the Secretary of Labor failed to provide a written explanation of his determination to confine his review to the existing record. Appellant relies on 1 CMC § 9110(c), which states in part that "[a]ll orders or decisions, including initial or recommended orders or decisions, or those on agency review, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of: (1) [f]indings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis for them, on all material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record...." 1CMC § 9110(c).

The Court must conclude otherwise. The Secretary of Labor provided a basis for exercising his discretion to confine his review to the existing record by citing to 3 CMC § 4445(b)(1), which allows the Secretary of Labor, in his discretion to restrict view to the existing record. *See* 3 CMC § 4445(b)(1). Further the language of 3 CMC § 4445(b)(1), does not require the reviewing officer of a labor administrative appeal to state his reasons for exercising such discretion.

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Although the Secretary of Labor's mere citation to 3 CMC § 4445(b)(1) provides a rather perfunctory basis for exercising his discretion, the Court finds that the remainder of the decision, which reviewed the bases for Labor's initial refusal to grant Appellant transfer relief in light of the equities, impliedly found that the existent record was sufficient to render a decision. Consequently, the Secretary of Labor's decision to confine his review of Appellant's case to the existing record was not short of statutory rights or an abuse of discretion.

# B. Labor's Refusal to Grant Appellant Equitable Transfer Relief is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

In her administrative appeal, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Labor's denial of transfer relief because the Labor Hearing Officer's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(i), unsupported by substantial evidence, 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(v), short of statutory rights, 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(iii), or entered without observance of procedure mandated by law, 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(iv)...." The Court will address each claim individually.

The Court will first address Appellant's claim that the proceedings below were entered without observance of procedure mandated by law in accord with 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(iv). Appellant fails in either of its briefs to explain how either of the Labor proceedings in Appellant's case failed to observe mandated procedure. With regard to Appellant's initial hearing, Appellant fails to direct this Court's attention to one instance where the Labor Hearing Officer failed to follow procedures prescribed under section 4444 of the Nonresident Workers Act ("NWA") or section 9109 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Furthermore, the Court addressed Appellant's argument with regard to the Secretary of Labor's alleged error infra.

Likewise, Appellant makes no salient argument as to how Labor's refusal to grant transfer relief to Appellant was short of her statutory rights pursuant to 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(iii). As discussed supra,

there was substantial evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellant was not entitled to equitable transfer relief within the statutes of the APA. Furthermore, Appellant fails to cite any additional statutory rights which were denied to Appellant in so holding. Accordingly the Court will not set aside Labor's determination pursuant to 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(iii).

Before addressing Appellant's remaining claims it is important to establish this Court's standard of review. 1 CMC § 9112(f) prescribes the standard of review the Superior Court must apply when reviewing agency actions within the Administrative Procedure Act. *Camacho v. Northern Marianas Retirement Fund*, 1 N.M.I. 362 (1990).

Here, although Appellant claims that Labor's refusal to grant transfer relief should be overturned because they were arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence pursuant to 1 CMC § 9112(f)(2)(i) and (v), only one standard is required for this Court's analysis: whether the Labor's determination was supported by "substantial evidence". The Commonwealth Supreme Court has unequivocally held that a finding that there was substantial evidence to support an agency action, encompasses abuse of discretion standard set forth in subsection (i). *In re Hafadai Beach Hotel Extension*, 4 N.M.I. 37 (1993) ("In other words, as we found substantial evidence supporting the affirmance (sic) of the Board decision, it was not arbitrary and capricious"). Therefore, this Court will review the Labor's refusal of transfer relief to Appellant under the "substantial evidence" standard.

The Court in *In re Hafadai Beach Hotel Extension* further explained the "substantial evidence" standard:.

In judicial review of review of agency action, the substantial evidence standard for a finding of fact means that the decision must be reasonable after consideration of the facts in the record opposing the agency position as well as supporting it and the reviewing court is to uphold the agency finding *even if supported by something less than the weight of evidence....* 

In judicial review of agency action, questions of law under the substantial evidence or "reasonableness" standard are examined to determine if the agency's conclusions are reasonably based on the information package used by the agency in making the decision. *In re Hafadai Beach Hotel Extension*, 4 N.M.I. 37 (1993) (*emphasis added*).

Simply put, this Court must examine the Labor's handling of the case to determine whether the result reached by the agency is reasonable in light of the available facts and applicable law. As such, this Court will accord reasonable deference to the Agency's findings of fact as implied by *In re Hafadai*, when examining its holdings. By contrast, this Court will implement a stricter scrutiny of the agency's interpretations of law to ensure that they are indeed consistent with legislative intent of the Nonresident Workers Act.

Here, it is undisputed that Appellant was initially awarded transfer relief on account of another unrelated labor case. Pursuant to the transfer relief awarded, Appellant had forty-five (45) days to seek new employment, and with her prospective employer, submit a Commonwealth Nonresident Worker's Labor and Entry Permit Application to the Division of Labor. Appellant failed to report to the Division of Labor in the prescribed time with any prospective employer or a completed Labor and Entry Permit Application. Instead, Appellant was not heard from but remained in the Commonwealth until she was apprehended by immigration authorities on November 25,2002. Appellant then initiated this labor case by filing a complaint on December 16, 2002.

At the hearing, Appellant proffered several reasons for having failed to find work and return to the Division of Labor within the prescribed time-period of her temporary transfer authorization. First, Appellant claimed that she found a new employer, Steven Pangelinan, and entered into employment negotiations with Mr. Pangelinan, and gave Mr. Pangelinan \$500 to cover the cost of the application process (i.e. medical examination) but that Mr. Pangelinan failed to complete Appellant's Labor and Entry Permit Application or hire her, and subsequently abandoned Appellant without returning her money. Mr. Pangelinan corroborated Appellant's testimony that he offered to hire Appellant but failed to follow through with the application process, however, he denied accepting \$500 from Appellant.

Appellant further blamed her failure to return to the division of labor to file on the fact that she continued unsuccessfully to pursue employment with Mr. Pangelinan. Moreover, Appellant cited her poor knowledge of English language and her unfamiliarity with CNMI labor law to explain her failure to

comply with the initial terms of the 45-day transfer authorization.

Under 3 CMC 4444(e)(5) and (6) Labor may enforce its findings by allowing an nonresident employee to transfer ro another employee or impose "such other sanction, order or relief that may reasonably give effect to the purpose" of the Nonresident Workers Act. Simply put, the statute grants Labor the ability to employ a number of remedies in light of the peculiar circumstances of each labor case before it. Equitable transfer relief is one of these broad remedies which may be employed at the discretion of Labor.

Here, it is undisputed that Appellant violated CNMI law when Appellant failed to report to the division of labor after the 45-day transfer authorization period expired but nevertheless remained in the Commonwealth in excess of one year. It is further undisputed that Appellant did not file her labor case until shortly after she was apprehended for remaining in the CNMI illegally. The Labor Hearing Officer and the Labor Secretary challenged the credibility of Appellant's testimony that she was helpless to remedy her situation before the 45 days expired by noting that Appellant had at least a chance to passively observe the CNMI labor laws in action during her participation in her initial labor case. *See In the Matter of Wu, Mei Wen v. Steven Pangelinan*, L.C. No. 02-285 (Administrative Order) (May 1, 2003); *In the Matter of Wu, Mei Wen, v, Steven Pangelinan*, L.C. No. 02-285 (Administrative Order: Appeal)(May 20, 2004). Moreover, the Hearing Officer found that Appellant's testimony of helplessness was incredible on the basis of his finding that Appellant was savvy enough to seek assistance from the federal ombudsman.

Although the Court cannot but sympathize with Appellant in light of some of the details of her ordeal, it will not interfere with Labor's determination not to extend equitable transfer relief to Appellant. Labor has broad discretion to grant or deny equitable relief under 3 CMC 4444(e)(5) and (6). Labor conducted its hearings according to law and determined that Appellant's testimony that her ignorance of English, and of CNMI law, and the misdeeds of another was insufficient to warrant transfer relief. Labor questioned Appellant's excuses for non-compliance with CNMI law on the basis of

1	credibility and her motive. Consequently, the Court must find that Labor's decision was reasonably
2	based on the facts before it and a correct interpretation of applicable law.
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4	V. CONCLUSION
5	For the foregoing reasons, the Department of Labor's decision not to grant Appellant transfer
6	relief under 3 CMC 4444(5) and (6) is AFFIRMED.
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8	<b>SO ORDERED</b> this <u>16<sup>th</sup></u> day of <u>February</u> , 2007.
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10	DAVID A. WISEMAN
11	Associate Judge
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