1		
2		
3		
4	FOR PUBLICATION	
5		
6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE	
7	COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS	
8		
9	COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN) MARIANA ISLANDS,	CRIMINAL CASE NO. <u>09-0232(E)</u> D.P.S. CASE NO. 09-009484
10	)	D.F.S. CASE NO. <u>09-009464</u>
11	Plaintiff, )	
12	v. )	ORDER DENYING STAY
13	GERALDINE MARIE SANCHEZ, ) D.O.B. 07/06/1981 )	
14	Defendant. )	
15		
16	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>	
17	THIS MATTER came for hearing on October 7, 2010 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 223A for	
18	Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Execution. The Government was represented by Assistant	
19	Attorney General, Brian Gallagher. The Defendant appeared with counsel, Michael Curtis Brown,	
20	Assistant Public Defender. Pursuant to Commonwealth Rules of Appellate Procedure 8 and 9 and	
21	6 CMC §6402(b), Defendant filed this present motion to stay the Court's execution of sentence.	
22	Defendant requests a stay of execution of sentence arguing that a stay is warranted because	
23	Defendant's appeal raises substantial questions of law likely to result in a reversal of her conviction	
24	or in an order for a new trial. More specifically, Defendant contends that the Court erred when it	
25	did not apply the Common Law "coming of age" rule to the case at hand. Additionally, Defendant	
26	argues that the Court erred by denying Defendant's objection to the "on or about" jury instruction.	
27	For the reasons discussed below, the Court <b><u>DENIES</u></b> Defendant's Motion for Stay of Execution of	
28	Sentence.	

I

### II. BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2010, pursuant to a finding of guilt by a jury, the Court adjudged the Defendant Guilty of the offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the First Degree, in violation of 6 CMC § 1306 (a)(3)(A) in Count I, and the offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the Second Degree, in violation of 6 CMC §1307 (a)(1) as charged in Count II.

The Court sentenced Defendant to a term of twelve (12) years imprisonment for Count I, all suspended except the mandatory term of eight (8) years to be served without parole, with credit for six (6) days for time already served. In addition, the Court sentenced Defendant to a term of seven (7) years imprisonment for Count II. The Court ordered Defendant to report to the Department of Corrections on October 6, 2010 at 8:00 a.m. with a release date on September 30, 2018 at 8:00 a.m.

#### III. APPLICABLE LAW

Commonwealth Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 discusses relief pending an appeal.

Section (c) of said Rule states that "Rule 38 of the Commonwealth Rules of Criminal Procedure governs a stay in a criminal case." Com. R. App. P. 8(c). Rule 38(a)(2) of the Commonwealth Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"A sentence of imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant is released pending disposition of appeal. If not stayed, the court may recommend to the Attorney General that the defendant be retained under conditions, and at a place, which permit the defendant to assist in the preparation of his/her appeal to the court of appeals." Com. R. Crim. P. 38(a)(2).

Commonwealth Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 discusses release in a criminal case. Section (c) entitled Criteria for Release provides:

"The Court must make its decision regarding release in accordance with Commonwealth Rule of Criminal Procedure 46. Defendant has the burden of establishing that he or she will not flee or pose a danger to the community and that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or in an order for a new trial." Com. R. App. P. 9(c).

Pursuant to Commonwealth Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, the Court must examine three factors to determine whether a defendant is eligible for release pending appeal. Com. R. App. P. 9(c); Com. R. Crim. P. 46(c). A defendant has the burden of establishing that: (1) [s]he

will not flee the jurisdiction or pose a danger to the community; (2) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (3) the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or in an order for a new trial. \*Commonwealth v. Blas\*, 2004 MP 26 ¶ 5 citing \*Commonwealth v. Martinez\*, 4 N.M.I. 18, 20 (1993); Com. R. App. P. 9(c); Com. R. Crim. P. 46(c). A "substantial question" of law is one that is "fairly debatable" or "doubtful." \*Id. citing \*United States v. Handy\*, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985).

## IV. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

# A. Although Defendant Might Not Be a Flight Risk, She Does Pose a Danger to the Community.

Defendant argues that she is not a flight risk and does not pose a danger to the community. Defendant states that she moved to Saipan 7 years ago and since then has made Saipan her home. Defendant further states that she has significant family ties to Saipan and even though she has been free on bond since December 8, 2009, she has not fled the jurisdiction, but instead, has complied with the Court's conditions of release. In addition, Defendant claims that she does not pose a danger to the community since she has been a law-abiding citizen her entire life.

The Government counters by arguing that Defendant is a convicted sex offender and is no longer a law-abiding member of the community. The Court agrees.

Since Defendant is facing a substantial length of incarceration, the likelihood of flight is substantial. More importantly, an individual such as Defendant, who has been convicted of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the First Degree does pose a danger to the community. As such, this factor weighs in favor of denying Defendant's Motion.

# B. The Court Does Not Believe that the Appeal is Taken for the Purpose of Delay.

The Court does not believe that Defendant is appealing her conviction for the purpose of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 6 CMC § 6402(b) provides: "[a]fter conviction bail may be allowed only if a stay of execution of the sentence has been granted and only in the exercise of discretion by a court authorized to order a stay or by a judge thereof." 6 CMC § 6402(b). Here, because the stay of execution is denied, the Court finds that Defendant's request for bail is moot.

delay. Defendant has objected to the Court's application of the "birthday rule" during the course of trial and instead believes that the Court should have applied the Common Law "coming of age" rule.<sup>2</sup> As such, this factor weighs in favor of granting Defendant's Motion.

# C. The Appeal Does Not Raise a Substantial Question of Law or Fact Likely to Result in Reversal or in an Order for a New Trial.

The crux of Defendant's appeal hinges on the age of the victim at the time of the alleged offense. Defendant claims that the victim could have been 16 years of age during the time of the sexual assault since the offense occurred "on or about August, 2009, until the first week of September, 2009." Defendant argues that because the victim's 16<sup>th</sup> birthday was on September 6, 2009, had the Court given the "coming of age" jury instruction, the jury might have returned a not guilty verdict. Defendant bases this belief on the fact that the evidence presented at trial was that the offense occurred "before my birthday," with no other information given.<sup>3</sup>

Under the Common Law "coming of age" rule the age of an individual is determined on the first moment of the day preceding his or her actual birthday. Defendant claims that if the Court were to apply this rule, Counts I, II, and III of the Indictment would have been dismissed since the Commonwealth would not have been able to satisfy the age element required under either of these Counts. To support her position, Defendant cites case law from multiple jurisdictions which applied the Common Law rule absent statutory and/or case law.

Although both parties supply the Court with ample case authority supporting each of their positions, the case of *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delmar Hooks*, which was not cited by either party is directly on point. *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delmar Hooks*, 921

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Under the "coming of age" Common Law rule, a person reaches a given age at the earliest moment of the day before his day of birth. *In the Matter of Terry Anton Robinson*, 120 N.C. App. 874, 876 (1995). Under the more modern "birthday rule" a person attains a given age on the anniversary date of his or her birth. *Id.* at 877.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In sum, Defendant is claiming that if the sexual assault occurred on September 5, 2009, the victim would have been 16 years old, regardless of the fact that the victim's actual birth date fell on the following day. Notwithstanding that argument, the jury concluded that the sexual assault occurred before the victim's 16<sup>th</sup> birthday based on the evidence presented to the Court. Therefore, Defendant did not establish the reasonable doubt necessary to convince the jury that the sexual assault happened before September 6, 2009. In addition, the Court did not give the "coming of age" jury instruction for the reasons set forth in this Order. Finally, giving a "coming of age" jury instruction would only have aided the defense if the sexual assault occurred on September 5, 2009 and not on any other day in August or during the first week of September.

A.2d 1199 (2007).

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delmar Hooks, Appellant's sexual encounter with the victim occurred one day before her 16<sup>th</sup> birthday. Appellant relied on the Common Law rule stating that a person reached a given age on the day before her birth date to argue that insufficient evidence established that the victim was under 16. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the legitimate state interest of the sexual abuse of a minor statute was to protect minors under 16 from older teenage and adult sexual aggressors. As such, the court found that the use of the Common Law rule perpetuated an injustice upon children, which the law and society had expended great legislative and social energies to correct.

In the Commonwealth, the rules of the common law as expressed in the Restatements of Law as approved by the American Law Institute serve as the applicable rules of decision, in the absence of written or local customary law to the contrary. 7 CMC § 3401; *Ito v. Marco Energy, Inc.*, 4 N.M.I. 46 (1993). If a NMI court is to formulate a common law based on public policy, the policy must be implicated in either local law or a recognized need to safeguard the welfare of the general public. *Castro v. Hotel Nikko Saipan, Inc.*, 4 N.M.I. 268 (1995).

When a Common Law rule, in effect, would pervert justice and contravene legislative and societal needs, and it is not in the best interest of justice or public policy, a change by the court is mandated. *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delmar Hooks*, 921 A.2d 1199, 1208 (2007).

In the Legislative findings of the Sexual Abuse Law, Public Law 12-82, the Legislature made its intent clear that more severe penalties were necessary to ensure the *protection of the community* and to adequately deter persons from engaging in this type of conduct. PL 12-82, (Emphasis Added). Therefore, it is "ludicrous to suggest that the legislature of this Commonwealth, who enacted a statute to protect children from sexual aggressors and that is dependent upon the age of a particular victim for its enforcement, intended that for the purposes of the statute, child victims would turn [16] the day before their [16]th birthday." *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delmar Hooks*, 921 A.2d 1199, 1208 (2007).

Here, the facts as found by the jury, remain that the victim was under the age of 16 when
the abuse was committed upon him. The Court did not provide its own interpretation of the
unequivocal statute applicable to the case, nor did it infer as to what point close to 16 years of
age a victim would have to be for the statute not to apply. The Court followed the law as written
and acknowledged that public law represents the will and sentiment of the people of the
community.

The Court concluded that when it comes to sexual abuse of a minor, the public has

The Court concluded that when it comes to sexual abuse of a minor, the public has spoken loud and clear, with harsh sentences such as a 30 year and 10 year jail terms for the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> degree sexual abuse of a minor, respectively. Applying the Common Law "coming of age" rule would be contrary to the will of the people as expressed through our laws, which the Court is bound to follow.

Moreover, the "effect of using the Common Law rule to determine age would be to provide a criminal wrongdoer a pass on the extreme harm perpetrated against a child by the medieval fiction that a child reaches 16 years of age the day before his birthday for penal law purposes." *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delmar Hooks*, 921 A.2d 1199, 1210 (2007). As such, the Court concluded that a person reaches a given age on the date of his or her birth and not on the earliest part of the day before the individual's said birthday.

### V. CONCLUSION

After a full and close analysis and consideration of all that Defendant has offered, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant has failed to satisfy the requirements necessary for issuing a stay. As such, Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Execution is hereby **DENIED.** 

SO ORDERED this 18th day of October, 2010.

26 /s/

David A. Wiseman, Associate Judge