

By order of the Court, **GRANTED** *Judge Kenneth L. Govendo*

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOR THE

CIVIL CASE NO. 10-0131

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

E-FILED CNMI SUPERIOR COURT E-filed: Sep 23 2013 10:23AM Clerk Review: N/A Filing ID: 54265452 Case Number: 10-0131-CV

FOR PUBLICATION

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COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS SHINJI FUJIE AND TOSHIN GROUP

PLAINTIFFS,

JOAQUIN Q. ATALIG AND

DEFENDANTS.

JOAQUIN Q. ATALIG AND RAMON QUICHOCHO,

COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS,

SHINJI FUJIE AND TOSHIE GROUP

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS.

INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND

STEPHEN J. NUTTING,

RAMON QUICHOCHO,

INTERNATIONAL, INC. 8

VS.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a suit by the lessees of land, Shinji Fujie and Toshin Group International, Inc., against the lessor of the land and his attorney, Joaquin Q. Atalig and Ramon Quichocho ("Atalig" and "Quichocho"), respectively. The Plaintiffs brought this suit, asserting a variety of claims,

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following the Defendants' attempt to terminate the lease at issue in this case. The Court concluded, on lengthy and detailed consideration, that the Plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was, accordingly, granted.

Thereafter, the Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. In response, the Plaintiffs filed for sanctions against the Defendants. Similarly, the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions against the Plaintiffs.

The Court issued an Order to Show Cause against Quichocho and Robert Myers ("Myers") in response to the motion for reconsideration, which contains abusive and derogatory language directed at the Court and Stephen Nutting.

The hearing in this matter was set for September 3, 2013, at 9:00 A.M. The Defendants in this case, Joaquin Atalig and Ramon Quichocho, together with Atalig's attorney, Robert Myers, filed a lawsuit against the undersigned at 7:54 A.M. on September 3, 2013. Quichocho filed a motion to disqualify, in this case, thirteen minutes after the lawsuit was filed. The hearing in this matter was continued to September 6, 2013, to allow the Court to consider the Motion to Disqualify. The Motion to Disqualify was subsequently denied from the bench.

II. DISCUSSION

The Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on May 10, 2013. The Plaintiffs responded by alerting the Court that the majority of the Defendants' motion for reconsideration was copied from the Defendants' opposition to summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against the Defendants for refusing to withdraw the motion for reconsideration. The Defendants responded by filing a motion for sanctions against the Plaintiffs.

Less than an hour before the hearing, Defendant Ramon Quichocho filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned. The Court begins its analysis by examining the motion to disqualify.

A. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

The Motion to Disqualify is denied. The Court finds that a reasonable person with knowledge of all of the facts would not question the impartiality of the undersigned in this matter.

Defendant Quichocho's Motion to Disqualify was made pursuant to 1 CMC § 3308(a): "A justice or judge of the Commonwealth shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The Court employs an objective standard to determine when disqualification is necessary under § 3308(a). Tudela v. Superior Court, 2010 MP 6 ¶ 25. "Under this standard, a trial judge is required to recuse himself or herself when 'a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might be questioned." Saipan Lau Lau Dev., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 2000 MP 12 ¶ 5 (citation omitted). There are no strict procedural requirements for bringing a motion disqualify under § 3308(a) "and the motion is not strictly construed against recusal." Id. (citation omitted). Further, the motion is not subject to the affidavit requirement of Canon 3(D)(c) of the Commonwealth Code of Judicial Conduct. Tudela, 2010 MP ¶ 15.

In the Commonwealth, "[t]he mere filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct is not grounds for recusal." In re Estate of Malite, 2010 MP 20 ¶ 18 (quoting Ginsberg v. Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009). "It would be detrimental to the judicial system if a judge had to disqualify himself anytime someone filed a complaint about his conduct." Id. "Otherwise, an attorney would need only file a complaint, possibly groundless, to avoid a particular judge thereafter." Id. (quoting Ball v. Melsur Corp., 633 A.2d 705, 709 (Vt. 1993)). Here, Quichocho and Myers filed a lawsuit against the undersigned, not a judicial complaint. However, the reasoning of In re Estate of Malite is equally applicable to this case. Namely, "[a] judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.' Such an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed." Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona,

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686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. Ariz. 1981) (quoting United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977)). "[E]ach judge must be alert to avoid the possibility that those who would question his impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the consequences of his expected adverse decision." Commonwealth v. Caja, (NMI Super. Ct. April 23, 1999) (Order Den. Defs.' Mot. Disg. of

Associate Judge John Manglona at 3) (citations omitted).

Here, the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the lawsuit and accompanying motion to disqualify were filed solely to avoid an adverse decision. First, the events complained of in the lawsuit against the undersigned occurred over two years ago. Second, the lawsuit and the motion to disqualify were filed less than an hour before the sanctions hearing. Third, the Defendants have not served the undersigned with the lawsuit. Finally, this is not the first time Quichocho has used a lawsuit to avoid a potentially adverse ruling. Quichocho recently delayed a hearing before the Honorable Judge Wiseman by filing a lawsuit against his wife, Faythe Wiseman. Similar to this case, Quichocho did not inform Judge Wiseman prior to the hearing that a potentially disqualifying lawsuit had been filed.

The timing of the lawsuit filed by the Defendants is not a coincidence. The motion to disqualify was meant to delay the sanctions hearing and prevent an adverse ruling. It is not a strategy that will be permitted in this Court. Accordingly, the Court holds that the mere filing of a lawsuit against the presiding judge does not, on its own, constitute grounds for recusal.

Having reviewed the facts and circumstances giving rise to Quichocho's motion, the Court does not believe that a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the undersigned. Therefore, the Motion to Disqualify is denied.

The Defendants move the Court to vacate its Opinion and Order issued on May 10, 2013,

B. MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure. Reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary measure to be taken at the Court's discretion. Commonwealth v. Brana, Civil Action Nos. 04-0583, 05-0006 (NMI Super. Ct. November 28, 2005) (Order Den. Recon. at 1) (citations omitted). Motions to reconsider "run contrary to notions of finality and repose [and] should be discouraged. In re August. 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Ind. 1994). "[T]he standard for approving a motion for reconsideration in the civil context is 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Commonwealth v. Eguia, 2008 MP 17 ¶ 7 (quoting Camacho v. J.C. Tenorio Enter., Inc., 2 NMI 408, 414 (1992)).

Motions for reconsideration can be effective devices for correcting errors of law, calling attention to new evidence, or preventing manifest injustice. Unfortunately, motions for reconsideration are often used in the Commonwealth to delay the administration of justice and increase the costs of litigation. Here, the Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration that is almost entirely a word for word copy of their previously filed opposition to summary judgment. The following portions of the Defendants' motion for reconsideration appear to be exact copies, regurgitated word for word, from the Defendants' opposition to summary judgment:

Motion for Reconsideration	Opposition to Motion for Summary
	Judgment
The gist: The word abandon has a different meaning than the word abandonment.	Verbatim copy at: P. 6 L. 9 – P. 7 L. 7.
Found at: P. 6 L. 13 – P. 7 L 8.	
The gist: Abandonment is an issue of fact.	Verbatim copy at: P. 7 L. 9 – 18.
Found at: P. 8 L. 5 – L. 14.	
The gist: Plaintiff abandoned the premises in	Verbatim copy at: P. 7 L. 20 – 26.
2006.	
Found at: P. 8 L. 16 – L. 22.	
The gist: Notice of termination was valid.	Verbatim copy at: P. 8 L. 1 – 6, 11-17; P. 5 L.
Found at: P. 8 L. 24 – P. 9 L. 21.	22 – P. 6 L. 4.

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The gist: Defendants did not slander Plaintiff's	Verbatim copy at: P. 11 L. 25 – P. 12 L. 10; P.
title.	12 L. 11 – 16; P. 12 L. 17 – 26.
T	
Found at: P. 9 L. 28 – P. 10 L. 13; P. 10 L. 13 –	
22; P. 10 L. 27 – P. 11 L. 7.	
The gist: Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary	Verbatim copy at: P. 3 L. 13 – P. 4 L. 4.
1	Verbatiiii copy at. 1 . 3 E. 13 1 . 4 E. 4.
judgment for oreach of contract.	
Found at: P. 12 L. 17 – P. 13 L. 10.	
The gist: Atalig did not breach his contractual	Verbatim copy at: P. 4 L. 25 – P. 5 L. 17.
duty to provide the Plaintiff with quiet	
enjoyment of the property.	
F 1 + P 12 + 24 P 14 + 172	
	West ation assessed D.O.I. 10 D. 11 I. A.
	Verbatim copy at: P. 9 L. 18 – P. 11 L. 4
icasc.	
Found at: P 14 L 22 – P 16 L 10 ³	
100000001112022 11102010	
	title. Found at: P. 9 L. 28 – P. 10 L. 13; P. 10 L. 13 – 22; P. 10 L. 27 – P. 11 L. 7. The gist: Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment for breach of contract. Found at: P. 12 L. 17 – P. 13 L. 10. The gist: Atalig did not breach his contractual

The Defendants' motion to reconsider does not call the Court's attention to law that the Court overlooked in its order; it does not reveal the existence of new evidence; it does not direct the Court to manifest error of fact or law. Instead, the Defendants' arguments are literally copied from their opposition to summary judgment, word for word, and styled as a motion to reconsider. The motion for reconsideration filed by Defendants has wasted time, money, and unduly burdened the the Court. Defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied.

C. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER

Defendants' motion indicates that Defendants seek relief from the Court's Order and Opinion issued on May 10, 2013, pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Defendants identify the

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¹ In this paragraph the Defendants spiced things up by criticizing the Court. Otherwise, it is a replication of page twelve, lines eleven through sixteen of Defendants' Opposition.

² In this paragraph the Defendants added several new lines in reference to a man named Mustafa Shakir. Aside from Defendants' minor alteration, the lines on pages thirteen and fourteen are an encore of the prose found on pages four and five of the Defendants' Opposition.

³ The Defendants' added a few additional words and included a snide footnote. In all other respects, the lines on pages fourteen through sixteen are a recapitulation of Defendants' Opposition. Memorandum Opinion and Order

legal standard for NMI R. Civ. P. 60(b), but do not further address the issue in their motion.

Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Relief From Judgment Under Rule 60(b) is denied.

D. RULE 11 SANCTIONS

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On June 17, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Defendants, pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 11, for filing a frivolous motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 2013, the Defendants filed an opposition and counter-motion for sanctions against counsel for Plaintiffs. On August 6, 2013, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause against Defendants for violation of NMI R. Civ. P. 11(b). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies both motions for sanctions. On its own initiative, the Court imposes sanctions against Ramon Quichocho and Robert Myers.

Motions for sanctions are governed by Rule 11 of the Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure. "By presenting to the court . . . [a] written motion . . . an attorney . . . is certifying to the best of the [attorney's] knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." NMI R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). If the Court determines that a motion has been filed to harass, delay proceedings, or increase the cost of litigation, then the Court may impose appropriate sanctions upon the attorneys responsible. NMI R. Civ. P. 11(c). Rule 11 sanctions may be initiated by motion of an opposing party or by the order of the Court. <u>Id.</u> The motion for sanctions must (1) be separate from other motions or requests; (2) and must describe the specific conduct alleged to violate Rule 11(b). NMI R. Civ. P. (c)(1)(A). The motion for sanctions must be served in accordance with NMI R. Civ. P. 5, but not filed unless the challenged document has not been withdrawn after nine business days have passed. Id. If initiated by the Court, the order to show cause must describe the specific conduct of the attorney appearing to violate Rule 11(b). NMI R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B). The Court may impose sanctions "sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." NMI R. Civ.

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P. 11(c)(2). If an award of attorney's fees is included as part of the sanction, "such fees must be reasonable and must be incurred as a direct result of the violation." Ferriera v. Borja,1999 MP 23 ¶ 12. "A party is entitled to notice and a hearing before sanctions are imposed, but an "additional hearing on the amount of the fees is not necessary to satisfy the due process requirement of the Constitution." Id. ¶ 10. The burden falls on the movant to show that the time expended was reasonable. Id. ¶ 13.

1. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FILED BY THE PARTIES

The Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions does not comply with NMI R. Civ. P. 11 because it does not describe the specific conduct that the Defendant is alleged to have violated. Instead, it directs the Defendants to the Plaintiffs' opposition to the Defendants' motion for reconsideration. The clear language of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) requires that the motion itself contain a description of the specific conduct that is in violation of Rule 11(b). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions is denied.

The Defendants' motion for sanctions was contained in the Defendants' opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion or request. NMI R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Defendants motion for sanctions is denied.

2. TYPOGRAPHICAL SIGNATURE OF ROBERT MYERS

At the sanctions hearing on September 6, 2013, Myers informed the Court that he did not authorize the motion for reconsideration or the accompanying reply. Thus, he argues that he is not responsible for the inappropriate content of the motion for reconsideration and the reply. The Court disagrees.

The Court begins its analysis by noting that Myers filed a document titled Opposition to Notice of Motion and Motion for Sanctions and Order to Show Cause ("Opposition"). The

3. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

practicing in this jurisdiction and will not be tolerated.

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Opposition argues that the motion for reconsideration should be granted, is not frivolous, and should not result in sanctions. The Opposition does not argue, or even hint, that Myers did not approve the motion for reconsideration. To summarize, Myers argued in favor of a motion bearing his name, but simultaneously denies all responsibility for the contents of the motion.

All documents in this case were filed electronically. Any document filed "filed or served [electronically] shall be deemed to have been signed by the . . . attorney . . . and shall bear a scanned facsimile or typographical signature of such person, along with the typed name, address, telephone number, and Bar number of a signing attorney. Typographical signatures shall be in the form of a conforming signature ("/s/")." Com. E-Filing R. 6.5(a). Here, the motion for reconsideration and the reply included the typed name, address, telephone number, and bar number of Robert Myers. The documents did not contain Myers's typographical signature.

Myers did not notify the Court that the submitted documents, bearing Myers's signature block, were submitted without Myers's permission. If the documents were truly submitted without Myers's permission, then Myers had an affirmative duty to inform the Court that he did not authorize the documents. Myers will not be allowed reap the potential benefits of a motion bearing his name while simultaneously disclaiming responsibility for its contents. Accordingly, the Court holds that the motion for reconsideration and the accompanying reply are deemed to have been signed by Myers.

The Court, upon its own initiative, sanctions the Defendants' counsel for violation of Rule

11(b) of the Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion for reconsideration filed by the

Defendants represents an incredible departure from the standards of conduct expected of attorneys

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3. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

attorneys practicing in this jurisdiction:

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The Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration that consists almost entirely, word for

word, of copied arguments from their opposition to summary judgment. The Defendants' actions

have wasted time, increased the expense of litigation, and squandered scarce judicial resources.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants' motion for reconsideration was submitted for an

improper purpose and that sanctions are warranted.

In addition, Quichocho and Myers chose to intersperse their motion for reconsideration and

subsequent filings with name calling, personal attacks, and wild conspiracy theories. The Court

finds that the inflammatory language used by Quichocho and Myers was improper and designed to

harass the Plaintiffs and the Court.

Quichocho and Myers shall be jointly and severally liable for all reasonable attorney's fees

and costs incurred by the Plaintiffs in responding to the Defendants' motion for reconsideration.

Plaintiffs are ordered to submit their costs and attorney fees within ten calendar days of the issuance

of this order.

Ramon Quichocho and Robert Myers shall each pay a fine of \$5,000 to the Clerk of Court.

A copy of this order will be forwarded to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Association

The fine is necessary to deter repetition of their conduct in this case and in other matters before this

Court. Payment shall be made no later than thirty (30) calendar days following the issuance of this

for the initiation of proceedings against Ramon Quichocho and Robert Myers. The following

behavior of counsel and inflammatory language deviates from the standards required of all

Order.

- The Defendants' attorneys have made numerous claims of racism against the undersigned.
 They have misconstrued and misrepresented the holding of the Supreme Court in <u>In Re</u>
 <u>Govendo</u>, 2010 MP 16.
- 2. Accusing the Court of "conveniently forgetting" the Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure to benefit another party. (Mot. to Recon. 15, n. 5.)
- 3. Referring to a decision of this Court as "bizarre". (Mot. to Recon. 16.)
- 4. The following statement: "Which begs the question whether the Court intends to get rid of locals by not honoring Lease [sic] agreements that favor locals, who are fee-simple owners of the lands in the CNMI." (Mot. to Recon. 16.)
- 5. Accusing the Court of purposely ignoring the law and the facts. (Mot. to Recon. 17.)
- 6. Misrepresenting the Court's Order by implying that Defendant Atalig is being forced from his property because he is a local. ⁴ (Mot. to Recon. 17.)
- 7. Accusing the Court of ruling against Defendants, not because they were wrong, but because Ramon Quichocho is a local, married to a Filipina, and has Filipino children. (Mot. to Recon. 18.)
- 8. Accusing the Court, without an iota of support, of committing ethical violations against Quichocho. (Reply in Supp. Mot. to Recon. 6.)
- 9. The following statement: "On May 9, 2013, at 2:06 p.m., Nutting sent a "settlement offer" to [Quichocho] and Myers. The offer was so lopsided that it leaves Quichocho and Atalig wondering whether it was merely paving the way for the Court's May 10, 2013, Order." (Decl. Quichocho Supp. Opp. Sanctions 2, n. 2.) Here, Quichocho accused the undersigned and Stephen Nutting of engaging in some sort of criminal conspiracy.

⁴ Defendant Atalig is being held to the lease agreement that he entered into, nothing more. Memorandum Opinion and Order