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FOR PUBLICATION



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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RAMON M. DELA CRUZ,	CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0220T
Plaintiff,	
v.)	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
JOEY P. SAN NICOLAS and the COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS ELECTION COMMISSION,	
Defendants.	

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER came before the Court for defendants' motions to dismiss on December 2, 2014, and December 5, 2014, in Courtroom 202A. Plaintiff Dela Cruz ("Plaintiff") was represented by Mark Hanson, Esq. Defendant San Nicolas was represented by Matthew Gregory, Esq. Chief Prosecutor Brian Flaherty represented the Commonwealth Election Commission ("CEC").

Based on review of the filings, oral argument, and applicable law, the Court hereby issues this written decision GRANTING Defendant San Nicolas' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's felony voter claim following its oral pronouncement in Court. CEC's motion to dismiss as an improper defendant is hereby DENIED, and Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss Plaintiff's remaining claims following the results of the recount is hereby GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

On November 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint contesting the November 4, 2014, mayoral election held on Tinian in which Defendant San Nicolas was the winner by a margin of seven votes. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 21). The total number of votes for the mayoral candidates was as follows: Dela Cruz-696, Cing-46, San Nicolas-703, for a grand total of 1,445 votes cast. *Id.* In Plaintiff's complaint, five irregularities were alleged: (1) CEC's failure to include 10 votes physically cast on Tinian but not later tabulated on Saipan; (2) a four-vote discrepancy between the amount of ballots actually dispersed but not accounted for at the polling place; (3) seven votes cast by voters serving a sentence for a felony; (4) adulteration of ballots by CEC; and (5) double voting by three absentee voters. *Id.* ¶ 22.

Subsequently, CEC filed its motion to dismiss asserting that: (1) they are an improper defendant under the current election contest statutes; (2) Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff waived his right to challenge voter qualification after the election; and (3) that Plaintiff's complaint fails to set forth the actual prejudice requirement necessary under the law.¹ (Def. CEC's Mot. to Dismiss at 11). Defendant San Nicolas partially joined CEC's motion to dismiss and also filed his own motion asserting that dismissal of the felony voter claim is appropriate due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Def. San Nicolas' Mot. to Dismiss at 2).

Following defendants' filings of their motions to dismiss, the first stage of the recount ("Recount I") was conducted on December 1, 2014, on Tinian. At Recount I, CEC recounted the ballots for the Tinian mayoral election while also providing oral testimony outlining the procedures that were being utilized. During the recount, ballots were segregated into four

¹ The Court ruled in its November 24, 2014, Order Setting Election Contest Hearing that Plaintiff set forth enough facts in his complaint to satisfy the actual prejudice requirement entitling him to a recount.

categories: (1) general election ballots; (2) Tinian early voting ballots; (3) Saipan early voting ballots; and (4) absentee ballots. The four categories were counted separately. Additionally, ballots were set aside if they were reconstructed ballots and were later verified by CEC and tabulated accordingly.² At the close of the recount the total number of votes for each candidate was as follows: Dela Cruz-696, Cing-47, San Nicolas-705, with a grand total of 1,448 votes cast.³

The second part of the recount ("Recount II") was held on December 3, 2014, on Tinian. During Recount II, CEC recounted and inventoried the total number of ballots used during the election. The CEC commissioners also accounted for and performed a reconciliation of the absentee voter registration procedures. This accounting provided the following computations: (1) CEC ordered 1,951 ballots; (2) 1,948 of those ballots were inventoried on September 20, 2014; (3) the total number of ballots counted in the recount was 1,463; (4) 423 unused ballots were accounted for on December 2, 2014; (5) 60 absentee ballots were never returned to CEC; (6) 5 ballots were reconstructed to replace mutilated ballots; and (7) one ballot was rejected by CEC at the December 1, 2014, recount. These tabulations show that CEC accounted for 1,952 ballots during the inventory process.

Following Recount II, both CEC and Defendant San Nicolas renewed their motions to dismiss arguing that Plaintiff's remaining claims were either resolved by the recount or failed to satisfy the actual prejudice requirement under the statute.⁵

There were a total of 5 reconstructed ballots set aside that were later matched to 6 mutilated ballots in CEC's possession. CEC decided to reject the one unmatched ballot after determining that the reconstructed ballot was most likely inadvertently counted earlier.

The grand total increased by 3 votes from the original numbers reported by CEC on November 4, 2014. These additional votes increased San Nicolas' lead by 2 votes and increased Cing's total by 1 vote.

⁴ These tabulations show that there is a variance of 4 from the number of ballots inventoried on September 20, 2014, and the total number of ballots cast.

⁵ Plaintiff's felony voter claim was dismissed by the Court in its oral pronouncement on December 3, 2014. Additionally, at the December 5, 2014 motion to dismiss hearing Plaintiff conceded that his fourth claim

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have raised various issues in their motions to dismiss to which the Court analyzes each separately below.

A. PLAINTIFF'S FELONY VOTER CLAIM

Defendant San Nicolas' first motion to dismiss asserts that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to NMI. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies to properly challenge the seven felony voters⁶ prior to or on election day. NMI Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits dismissal of a case where a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. *Atalig v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n*, 2006 MP 1 ¶ 16. If the court lacks jurisdiction, it has no authority to enter judgment and must dismiss the case. *Id* . Courts will not review an agency decision unless an adequate showing has been made that the party has exhausted its administrative remedies. *I.G.I. Gen. Contr. & Dev. V. Public Sch. Sys.*, 1999 MP 12.

The election statutes set forth a detailed procedure for challenging a voter's qualifications. This procedure includes the requirement that a list of eligible voters be provided for public examination not less than fifteen days before the day of election. 1 CMC § 6208. This list must be posted at the Commission and mayor's office. *Id.* A voter may then challenge the right of a person to vote any time prior to and including election day. 1 CMC § 6215(a)-(b). A voter qualification challenge must be made in writing, under penalty of perjury, and lodged with the Executive Director of the CEC. 1 CMC § 6215(a)-(e). An appeal from the Executive Director may then be taken to a three person panel, from which the challenge may

regarding CEC's adulteration of ballot was no longer viable after the recount and therefore withdrew that claim.

⁶ Although Plaintiff's complaint asserts that the impropriety of seven felony voters, during the course of the recount Plaintiff asserted that this number may have been reduced to two felons. This is further supported by Plaintiff's submitted witness list in that only two witnesses were labeled as felony voters.

then be taken to the Superior Court for judicial review. 1 CMC § 6215(e)(f). However, judicial review is limited only to final agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. 1 CMC § 9101.

In this case, Plaintiff failed to challenge the alleged seven felony voters prior to Election Day and now seeks to challenge them after the time allotted by statute. The legislature specifically provided a detailed rubric in which to bring a challenge, and Plaintiff failed to follow such procedure. In failing to first exhaust his administrative remedies, Plaintiff may not now bring this claim as part of an election contest. Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiff's claim based upon the impropriety of seven felony voters participating in the mayoral election is proper because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.⁷

B. CEC AS A PROPER DEFENDANT

CEC asserts in its initial motion to dismiss that it is not a proper defendant under the current election contest statute; the Court disagrees.

The Commonwealth Election Law sets forth that when a voter contests an election, he must specifically put forth the name of the defendant and the office the defendant sought.

1 CMC § 6603(a). The Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure allow for joinder of a necessary party to the action when complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties. *See* MMI R. Civ. P. 19. Additionally, CEC has been a named defendant in numerous election contest cases⁸ and has been joined *sua sponte* as a party to an election contest by the court itself. *Hocog v. Mendiola*, Civ. No. 09-0471 (NMI Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2009) (Order Requiring Joinder of the Commonwealth Election Commission).

²³ Although CEC's motion to dismiss asserted the same challenge to Plaintiff's felony voter claim, the Court declines to analyze the issue under this theory.

⁸ See, e.g., Rebeunog v. Aldan, Civil Action No. 09-0463; Atalig v. CEC, Civil Action No. 05-0516, Hocog v. Mendiola, Civil Action No. 09-0471.

This Court declines to adopt CEC's interpretation of the election contest statute in such a way as to restrict its ability to be a named party. CEC is necessary as a party due to the fact that the contestant is challenging CEC's actions during the election, not the winning candidate's actions. It is imperative that CEC be a party so as it can defend the procedural steps it took during the election. Also, without its joinder the Court would be powerless to order its cooperation during the election contest process. Additionally, as was seen during the recount, CEC was instrumental in detailing its procedures for the public. The Court would be unable to understand this process without their presence the entire process would be much more difficult. Thus, CEC is a proper defendant in an election contest case, and its motion to dismiss as an improper defendant is denied.

C. DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING CLAIMS

Both Defendants San Nicolas and CEC join in moving this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint following the recount election because Plaintiff's claims have either been resolved by the recount or they fail to satisfy the actual prejudice required by the statute. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with this assertion, and Plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

1. Mis-tabulation of Votes Physically Cast on Tinian Claim

As has been discussed above, only three of Plaintiff's five original claims in his complaint are still before this Court. These are: (1) CEC's failure to include 10 votes physically cast on Tinian but not later tabulated on Saipan; (2) a four-vote discrepancy between the amount of ballots actually dispersed but not accounted for at the polling place; and (5) double voting by absentee voters.

⁹ CEC's attorney seemed to assert that the Court would be empowered to force CEC's cooperation without its being a party. Such action would run afoul of a party's due process rights. Therefore, it would be improper for the Court to attempt to assert its power in such a way.

Plaintiff's first claim concerning a possible mis-tabulation of votes by CEC has been resolved through the recount process. CEC's November 4, 2014, tabulation shows that a total of 837 votes were physically cast on Tinian, including votes cast in the general election and early voting votes. Additionally, at the recount, CEC determined that a total of 840 votes had been cast on Tinian during the race. This means that there was a mis-tabulation on CEC's behalf in the November 4, 2014 counting, but this problem was rectified by the inclusion of the 3 additional votes during the recount. Thus, Plaintiff's claim regarding a mis-tabulation was confirmed and corrected by the recount and is therefore no longer at issue.

2. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims Fail to Satisfy the Actual Prejudice Requirement

Plaintiff's final challenge relates to the veracity of a total of seven votes. Following the results of the recount, Plaintiff's remaining claims do not rise to the level of actual prejudice and therefore must be dismissed.

A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims within the complaint. A complaint fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) where it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts constituting a cognizable legal theory. *Bolalin v. Guam Publications, Inc.*, 4 NMI 176 (1994). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must "review the contents of a complaint by construing it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all well-pleaded facts as true". *Zhang Gui Juan v. Commonwealth*, 2001 MP 18 ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

However, a complaint requires "more than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief". *Sayed v. Mobil Oil Marianas, Inc.*, 2012 MP 20 ¶ 20. Furthermore, the Court is not required to accept conclusions that are contradicted by the complaint's own exhibits or other

documents of which the court properly takes notice. *Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens*, 546 F.3d 580, 558 (9th Cir. 2008). The court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. *Oden v. Northern Marianas College*, 2003 MP 13 ¶ 7.

To bring an election contest case, Plaintiff must assert actual prejudice. 1 CMC 6602(a). For actual prejudice to exist, Plaintiff must present facts showing that the irregularity or misconduct complained of resulted in Defendant being declared either elected or tied for election. 1 CMC § 6602(a). "If the statements of the cause of the contest are insufficient, the court may dismiss the proceedings for lack of evidence...." 1 CMC 6605(a).

As is clear from the statute, election contests are irregular in nature and thus do not conform to normal rules of civil procedure. However, the Court does look to the rules of civil procedure for guidance in determining whether Plaintiff's remaining claims must be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court views Plaintiff's remaining claims in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff's remaining claims only challenge seven votes in total and even if these seven votes were determined to be invalid, it would not be enough to overcome Defendant San Nicolas' nine vote lead after the recount. Therefore, in light of the evidence obtained at the recount, Plaintiff's remaining claims do not satisfy the actual prejudice requirement, and Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant San Nicolas' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's felony voter challenge is granted, and CEC's motion to dismiss as an improper defendant is denied. Additionally, Plaintiff's remaining claims do not rise to the level of actual prejudice in light of

¹⁰ A four-vote discrepancy between the amount of ballots actually dispersed but not accounted for at the polling place and possible double voting by three absentee voters.

At the December 5, 2014, motions to dismiss hearing Plaintiff asserted various procedures that should be implemented by CEC to ensure for better ballot control measures. Although the Court does agree that Plaintiff's suggestions are logical, these changes would require legislative or rule making action.

the recount and therefore defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining claims is hereby granted. IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of December, 2014. ROBERTO C. NARAJA, Presiding Judge