

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

FOR PUBLICATION



E-FILED CNMI SUPERIOR COURT E-filed: Jan 20 2015 08:45AM Clerk Review: N/A Filing ID: 56628010 Case Number: 13-0227-CV

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

COMMONWEALTH UTILITIES CORPORATION,) CIVIL CASE NO. 13-0227
Plaintiff,)) ORDER GRANTING
v.	DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
COMMONWEALTH HEALTHCARE CORPORATION,)))
Defendant.)
))

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

THIS MATTER came before the Court on May 29, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 223A on Defendant's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiff Commonwealth Utilities Corporation ("CUC") was represented by James Sirok, Esq. and Michael White, while Defendant Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation ("CHCC") was represented by Assistant Attorney Generals David Lochaby, Reena Patel, and Teresita Sablan.

Based upon the Court's review of the parties' filings and arguments made during the hearings held in this matter, the Court issues the following order granting Defendant's request for preliminary injunction.

II. BACKGROUND

This case revolves around the efforts of the island's sole power utility company to collect allegedly unpaid utility bills from Saipan's sole hospital, where the hospital requested injunctive

By Order of the Court, Associate Judge DAVID A. WISEMAN

5

6

7

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

24

relief to insulate the operations of the hospital from being interfered with after CUC allegedly threatened to disconnect CHCC's utilities.

On December 10, 2013, CUC initiated a complaint against CHCC in the Commonwealth Superior Court to recover an alleged unpaid utility bill in the amount of \$9,690,875.67. On February 13, 2014, CHCC filed its Answer to CUC's Complaint, in which it denied CUC's claims and raised several affirmative defenses to CUC's lawsuit.

In early May 2014, both parties attempted — to no avail — to negotiate the terms of payment of CHCC's utility bills to settle the lawsuit out of court. According to CHCC, the main issue was its inability to pay accrued late charges — which accounted for approximately 25% of CUC's regular billings to CHCC — yet CUC nevertheless demanded CHCC pay each monthly bill to include all late charges. CUC allegedly made repeated threats to CHCC that if CHCC failed to pay each month's bill including the late charges, CUC would immediately commence the temporary disconnection of services at CHCC, where CUC would exercise its own discretion on which services they determined to be unnecessary.

In response, CHCC filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on May 12, 2014. CHCC requested this Court restrain CUC from disconnecting utility services for failure to pay what they claim were and are exorbitant and illegal late charges.

This Court promptly reviewed CHCC's case, and immediately issued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") against CUC on May 21, 2014, finding therein that CHCC would suffer immediate and irreparable injury should CUC disconnect any of CHCC's utility services as CHCC would become unable to provide critical healthcare and public health services to the public. (TRO, at 1.) This Court's TRO "restrained, enjoined, and prohibited [CUC] from disconnecting any utility services [CUC] provides to [CHCC], or with impeding or interfering in any manner with the provision of electric/water/sewer utility services to [CHCC]" and set Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction for hearing on May 29, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. (*Id.*)

22.

On May 29, 2014, the Court heard CHCC's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, in which it heard testimony from Esther Muna, the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of CHCC. The main focus of Ms. Muna's testimony revolved around CHCC's dire financial straits which have made it impossible to make full payments to CUC, as well as CHCC's attempts to reduce its energy consumption in efforts to lower its utility bills with CUC. Ms. Muna claimed that CHCC has made partial payments to CUC since January 2013, yet CUC filed the underlying lawsuit in May 2014 and continued to threaten to disconnect CHCC if it failed to pay its current consumption and late charges. Finally, Ms. Muna illustrated that any such disconnection of any of its services would cause irreparable harm by effectively rendering the Commonwealth's sole hospital inoperable, as well as the incidental effect the disconnection would have on CHCC's risk of losing CMS certification and the funding acquired therefrom.

At the hearing, CUC opposed CHCC's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, presenting arguments to the Court through its counsel alongside testimony from CUC Board of Directors Chairman David J. Sablan. CUC argued that CUC never threatened immediate disconnection of services to CHCC following the underlying lawsuit, and, while it declined to identify precisely which portions of CHCC's service could be safely disconnected, stated that any disconnection of services would only be to what it deemed to be "non-essential" portions of CHCC's operations. CUC also claimed that harm would result to CUC if CHCC failed to pay its late charges and make current its utility account with CUC.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ordered CHCC to continue making timely payments of its current utilities usage, not including late fees, interest, or penalties, until ordered otherwise. Further, in lieu of oral arguments, the Court ordered the parties to submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to include CUC's opposition to the preliminary injunction and

3

4

5 6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

24

CHCC's reply brief, as well as declarations from each party as to which services they deem to be "non-essential." Lastly, the Court ordered the previously issued TRO to remain in effect pending the Court's review of the briefs and its decision on the Preliminary Injunction.

On June 20, 2014, CUC filed its Written Argument in Opposition to Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, arguing that: (1) the Court's issuance of a TRO was not supported under NMI R. Civ. P. 65(b); (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction; (3) CHCC is estopped from requesting the Court to issue a preliminary injunction; and (4) CHCC has failed to prove the factors necessary for the Court to enter a preliminary injunction.

On July 3, 2014, CHCC filed its Written Argument for Preliminary Injunction, arguing in response that: (1) the Court's issuance of a TRO on May 21, 2014 was valid under NMI R. Civ. P. 65(b); (2) the Court has jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction against CUC; (3) CHCC has not waived its right nor is it estopped from requesting a preliminary injunction; and (4) CHCC has proven that a preliminary injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo in this case.

Based upon the foregoing factual and procedural background, the Court addresses the party's arguments relating to the necessity of the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

III. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

The Court now addresses the arguments of both parties relating to the necessity of issuing a preliminary injunction, as well as employs the applicable four factor test under Tinian Shipping which guides the Court's analysis.

Α. Validity of TRO under NMI R. Civ. P. 65(b)

First, CUC argues this Court's issuance of the May 21, 2014 TRO was invalid under NMI R. Civ. P. 65(b).

Pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure, a "Commonwealth Court may grant a TRO without written or oral notice to the adverse party's attorney if: (1) it 1 | cle
2 | and
3 | att
4 | the
5 | tha
6 | no
7 | rec

22.

clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required." NMI R. Civ. P. 65(b). Further, "[e]very TRO granted without notice must be endorsed with the date of issuance, shall be filed in the clerk's office and entered of record, shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice, and shall not exceed ten (10) days unless extended for good cause shown." *Id*.

Here, the Court granted CHCC's request for a TRO on May 21, 2014, without written or oral notice to the adverse party's attorney. After reviewing CHCC's motion and accompanying exhibits — which included (1) a Declaration by CHCC CEO Esther Muna, (2) an email from CUC counsel James Sirok to Ms. Muna, and (3) a Saipan Tribune article detailing CUC's threats to CHCC — the Court found good cause to believe that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage would result before the adverse party could be heard.

Specifically, Ms. Muna's Declaration illustrated such irreparable harm to both CHCC and, incidentally, the public, that would result if the Court did not grant CHCC's request for a TRO, including the risk of losing CMS certification — which accounts for nearly two-thirds of its annual budget — and being unable to operate as the sole hospital on the island as a result. Further, Ms. Muna explained that CUC is not qualified to determine what services can "safely" be disconnected, especially due to the fact that CUC is ignorant of the internal operations and relationships of the various CHCC services. Ms. Muna detailed a previous circumstance where CUC has demonstrated its willingness to disconnect CHCC services they deem to be "non-essential." CUC previously disconnected the Medicaid Office when it was still under the Governor's Office instead of CHCC, then reconnected the service when it was informed of this fact.

Furthermore, the Court properly considered the final two exhibits in CHCC's motion, which included both an email from CUC counsel to Ms. Muna and a Saipan Tribune article detailing CUC Board Chairman's involvement. First, CUC counsel James Sirok sent an email to CHCC CEO Esther Muna stating that CUC will disconnect utility services to CHCC unless it pays its next three monthly utility bills in full, including interest and penalties. Second, according to a Saipan Tribune article published on May 8, 2014, CUC Board Chairman David Sablan gave orders to CUC to immediately disconnect CHCC's "non-essential" accounts if it fails to pay its May billing in full.

Accordingly, the Court found that irreparable harm may result to CHCC and the general public if CHCC was unable to pay its billing in full, considering CUC repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to disconnect CHCC services they deem "non-essential," without illustrating which precise services it demes to be so or reasoning why such services are not essential to the operation of the sole hospital on the island. Moreover, any such disconnection of any of CHCC's services would likely affect the operation of the rest of the organization, due to the interconnectedness of all of the hospital's operations. In the May 21, 2014 TRO, the Court found that: "(1) CUC provides utility services to CHCC; (2) CUC has threatened to disconnect unspecified utility services to CHCC; and (3) CHCC would suffer immediate and irreparable injury if CUC disconnected any of its utility services as CHCC would become immediately unable to provide critical healthcare and public health services to the public." (TRO, at 1.)

In conclusion, the Court properly issued a TRO on May 21, 2014 pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P 65(b) when it found good cause that CHCC and the people of the Commonwealth faced immediate and irreparable harm, where there existed a significant risk that CUC would immediately disconnect services and thereby incapacitate the sole hospital in the CNMI.

Lastly, CUC argues that this Court should not enter a preliminary injunction because the Court erred in issuing its May 21, 2014 TRO. The Court rejects CUC's argument as inapposite, as

a TRO and preliminary injunction are entirely separate forms of injunctive relief which have no bearing on one another. Even assuming *arguendo* that this Court's issuance of a TRO was not permissible pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 65(b), such a determination would have no bearing on the Court's authority to enter a preliminary injunction pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 65(a).

B. Jurisdiction to Issue Preliminary Injunction

22.

CUC argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to enter a preliminary injunction because CHCC allegedly failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by not asking CPUC to order CUC not to disconnect its utility services. (Opp., at 11.) CHCC claims, and this Court agrees, that this argument is frivolous and not supported by law.

The Constitution, Commonwealth law, and relevant case law all bestow this Court with the inherent authority and original jurisdiction to issue such an order. NMI Const. art. IV, § 2 provides: "[t]he Superior Court shall have all inherent powers, including the power to issue all writs necessary to complete the exercise of its duties and jurisdiction under this constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth." Further, "[t]he Superior Court has original jurisdiction over all civil actions, in law and in equity . . . and has the power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all other writs and orders necessary and appropriate to the full exercise of its jurisdiction. 1 CMC § 3202. Specifically, the Superior Court will issue a preliminary injunction when it is necessary to preserve the status quo between parties to an action pending a final determination on the merits. See Villanueva v. Tinian Shipping and Transport, 2005 ¶ 19 (citing Pacific Am. Title Ins. & Escrow (CNMI), Inc. v. Anderson, 1999 MP 15 ¶ 8) (both partially overruled on other grounds in Friends of Marpi, et al. v. Commonwealth Government, et al., 2012 MP 9 ¶ 18).

This Court's original jurisdiction over the matter was activated once CUC initiated the lawsuit when it filed its Complaint on December 10, 2013. Thus, the Court has the proper

1 jurisdiction and authority to fashion a remedy to "preserve the status quo" by enjoining CUC from disconnecting services to CHCC until such a time as the Court makes a final determination on the 3 merits of CUC's lawsuit. In fact, the Court exercised its authority to do so when it issued a Temporary Restraining Order on May 21, 2014, preventing CUC from disconnecting services to 5 CHCC until both parties could be heard on the merits. The Court also ordered both parties to submit documentation demonstrating which services of CHCC each party deemed to be "non-6 7 essential," in an attempt to find a middle ground should such a termination be imminent or 8 absolutely financially necessary. While the parties failed to submit such documentation, the Court 9 does not find such guidance to be necessary to determine this issue or any other issue within this order; the interconnectedness of the hospital's operations, together with CHC's various efforts to 10 reduce energy consumption, provides sufficient cause to authorize the Court to grant injunctive 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

24

Accordingly, the Court holds that it has the proper jurisdiction and authority to grant the previously issued TRO.

relief against CUC in order to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm from befalling

C. Waiver of Right to Request Preliminary Injunction or Estoppel

the hospital and thus the people of the Commonwealth.

Next, CUC argues that CHCC waived its right to request this Court to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent CUC from disconnecting "non-essential" services, claiming that 4 CMC § 8141(g) requires CUC to disconnect services to consumers not actively contesting a dispute in billing and that CHCC failed to file a billing dispute over the accuracy of CUC's bills with CPUC. (Opp., at 12-15.)

The purpose of a preliminary injunction isn't to determine the merits of a case, but rather to preserve the status quo between the parties in an action pending a court's final determination on the merits. *Tinian Shipping*, 2005 MP at ¶ 19. No case law exists to support the argument that a party

waives his right to request injunctive relief due to missing an opportunity to dispute the opposing party's claims prior to the initiation of the lawsuit.

Here, the parties failed to reach an agreement during the course of settlement negotiations in early May 2014 regarding CHCC's payment of its current bills and accrued interests and penalties. CHCC requested injunctive relief immediately following written threats that CUC would imminently disconnect services if CHCC did not submit full payment of its monthly bills, including all interests in penalties, due to the risk of its inherent ability to function and provide critical healthcare services to the Commonwealth. CHCC's request was made for the purpose of preserving the status quo until the Court has the opportunity to determine the merits of the underlying lawsuit, not to challenge CUC's billings.

Thus, the Court finds that CHCC is not estopped from moving for injunctive relief.

D. <u>Tinian Shipping Four-Factor Test</u>

Having dispensed with the previously discussed arguments made by CUC in the Opposition filed in this matter, the Court now moves to the applicable four-factor test which guides the Court's analysis in deciding whether to grant CHCC's motion for preliminary injunction, analyzing each factor in turn. In essence, CHCC has requested this Court to enjoin CUC from disconnecting utility services for failure to pay CHCC's current bills, accrued interests, penalties, and late charges.

In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the Commonwealth courts will examine four factors: (1) whether the moving party has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the level of the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party if the relief is not granted; (3) the balance of hardships between the parties; and (4) any effect the injunction may have on the public interest. *Villanueva v. Tinian Shipping and Transport*, 2005 MP ¶ 20. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to determine the merits of the underlying suit, but to preserve the status quo between the parties pending the court's final determination on the merits of the case.

22.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first factor guiding the Court's analysis requires CHCC to demonstrate a *prima facie* showing of a right to relief in order to satisfy this factor. *See Saipan Achugao Resort Members' Assn. v. Wan Jin Yoon*, Civil Action No. 03-0187E, at 2 (Order Denying Motion for TRO and Prelim. Inj., July 7, 2003). That is, the evidence presented by CHCC does not need to be conclusive in order to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. *See id.* (citing *Terrell v. Terrell*, 719 N.Y.S.D. 41, 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).

Here, CHCC states that it "does not argue that it owes nothing to CUC," nor does it dispute the billings relating to its actual usage. Rather, CHCC challenges the legality of CUC's late charges on its account, as well as directly raises several affirmative defenses in its Answer to CUC's complaint, including: (1) the effect of Executive Order 2007-11 and all subsequent Emergency Orders pertaining to CUC; (2) Public Law No. 18-18, Section 604; (3) lack of standing; (4) lack of ripeness; (5) estoppel; (6) laches; and (7) prejudgment interest immunity. (Answer, at 1-3.)

The basis of CHCC's challenge related to the late fees is that they are exorbitant and in violation of both 4 CMC §§ 8451 and 8123(m), which require late fees to be just and reasonable and no higher than the actual cost to CUC to connect and provide utilities to its customers. CHCC claims the late fees it has been charged amount to over one million dollars and constitute nearly a quarter of each monthly CUC bill.

While the Court is cautious to posture itself vis-à-vis CHCC's myriad affirmative defenses, it does recognize that those detailed in CHCC's various memoranda are not frivolous arguments designed to delay the proceedings or make misrepresentations to the Court. The Court is particularly interested in the application of PL 18-18 § 604, which requires the Governor's approval for an agency to use "any part of their appropriations in connection with prosecuting a legal matter

1 ag
2 Or
3 an
4 su
5 ne
6 to

22.

against another agency," as well as Executive Order 2007-11 and other subsequent Executive Orders authorizing the Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to oversee and direct CUC's operations. Lastly, while the Court declines to comment on the likelihood of success of CHCC's excessive late fees argument, it does acknowledge that late fees accounting for nearly a quarter of CHCC's monthly utility bill are, likely in large part, causing CHCC to be unable to pay the full amount of the monthly bill. During the hearing on this matter, CHCC did, after all, agree to pay its current usage for the remainder of the suit without late fees, interests, or penalties.

Thus, the Court finds that CHCC has made a *prima facie* showing of likely success on the merits — at least in part — of the underlying suit.

2. Possibility of Imminent, Irreparable Harm

Second, the Court further examines the possibility of irreparable harm that would result if CHCC were not granted injunctive relief and CUC were allowed to terminate or disconnect utility services to CHCC.

In order to prove the irreparable harm factor, CHCC must demonstrate that any alleged injury is "actual and imminent, rather than a remote or speculative possibility, and that the alleged injury is incapable of being fully remedied by monetary damages." *Achugao Resort*, at 2, 7-11.

The Court has previously found, and does so again here, that any disconnection of services at CHCC would likely immediately render CHCC inoperable, resulting in what CHCC stated would be a "catastrophic reduction in healthcare services in the Commonwealth." The Court has also recognized that CUC, through its Chairman of the Board and counsel, have repeatedly threatened to disconnect services it deems to be "non-essential" at any time CHCC fails to pay the full amount of its monthly bills, including all late fees, interest, and penalties.

The fact that CUC has repeatedly failed to identify which exact services it deems to be "non-essential" — even in the face of a direct court order to do so — concerns the Court when

1 | con 2 | hos 3 | adn 4 | be 3 | 5 | case 6 | Div 7 | pati

22.

considering the potential damage that could be caused by disconnecting even a portion of the lone hospital's services, as each part of CHCC, including the hospital, the Public Health Division, and its administrative services, are necessarily interconnected such that all aspects of its organization must be fully operational in order for CHCC to function as a whole. CHCC represents to the Court the cascade of damage that would be caused by disconnecting utilities at the hospital, Public Health Division, and administrative services, which include being unable to provide critical care to patients, maintain public health and safety, bill for services, access vital medical records, and perform other day-to-day operations.

Most importantly, the Court recognizes that the principle concern of CHCC is maintaining its Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Certification — which accounts for the vast majority of CHCC's annual budget and was under review. Without power, air conditioning, clean water, or sewage services, CHCC would surely lose, or be in further danger of losing, its CMS Certification, which would surely cripple and likely destroy the very foundation of the hospital's operation, since a large number of the island's residents rely on Medicare and Medicaid to obtain health care.

However, beyond the impact a disconnection would have on the interconnected operation of CHCC's services and the risk of losing its CMS Certification, the Court is particularly concerned due to the fact that CUC is ignorant of the internal operations of CHCC and cannot reasonably determine which services could be safely disconnected. For example, at the hearing in this matter on May 29, 2014, CUC Board Chairman David J. Sablan suggested that CHCC's administrative offices could operate sufficiently without power by using flashlights and candles. The Court deigns to acknowledge this argument, but it suffices to say that such a statement succinctly demonstrates CUC's business-oriented indifference to CHCC's various functions and the integral role it plays in the lives of the people of the Commonwealth.

22.

Thus, the Court finds that the possibility of irreparable harm, which is actual, imminent, and not speculative, weighs heavily in favor of CHCC in deciding whether to grant injunction relief.

3. Balance of Hardships

Third, the Court balances the hardships between the respective parties if the requested injunctive relief were or were not to be granted.

On one hand, if the requested injunctive relief were granted, CUC would not be able to collect the full amount due on CHCC's account, including late fees, interest, and applicable penalties. However, CUC argues in its Opposition that CHCC will not be able to pay its monthly usage bills irrespective of the issuance of a preliminary injunction, despite the fact that CHCC was ordered by this Court after hearing held in this matter to pay its current usage bill for the remainder of the TRO, and the Court has not been made aware of an instance in which CHCC has failed to meet that requirement. Further, CHCC CEO Esther Muna explained in her testimony the various cost-cutting measures being undertaken at CHCC to lower its utility bills to ensure that it can pay its actual usage costs and drive down any further obligations to CUC. Thus, the apparent hardship to CUC if the injunction were granted is minimized by this Court's own order requiring CHCC to at least pay its current usage bill until its motion for preliminary injunction is decided.

On the other hand, the hardships facing CHCC if the injunction were not granted, as thoroughly detailed above, far outweigh any remainder of monetary or financial interest CUC would incur should the Court deny CHCC's request for injunctive relief. Avoiding redundant analyses, the Court stresses the detrimental and potentially devastating effect such a disconnection of any of CHCC's operations would have on its ability to provide critical care services, retain CMS Certification, and otherwise sustain the welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance of hardships factor weighs heavily in favor of granting the injunctive relief requested by CHCC.

4. Effect on Public Interest

Lastly, the Court considers any effect the issuance of a preliminary injunction would have on the public interest.

CUC argues in its Opposition that a preliminary injunction would harm the public because it could have serious ramifications to CUC's primary business, where CUC may be forced to increase its rates to consumers in order to recoup any services provided to CHCC essentially free of charge. (Opposition, at 21.) CHCC argues in response that the public has a paramount interest in ensuring that the people of the Commonwealth have access to its services as the sole hospital providing healthcare to most of its residents. (Response, at 12-13.)

Here, the Court recognizes that the ability to provide critical care services to the people of the Commonwealth is undoubtedly more important than any monetary loss CUC may incur during the remainder of the case. No evidence exists to support the hypothetical proposition that CUC would be forced to raise its base rates to consumers as a result of CHCC paying only for its current usage as opposed to the full amount due on its account, including late fees, interest, and applicable penalties, as the balance could potentially be recovered as damages in the underlying suit.

On a public policy note, the Court also believes that a public utility should not be allowed carte blanche to disconnect operations and services it deems, without justification, to be non-essential to the customer's continued operation, especially where the customer is a public corporation which provides critical and irreplaceable services to the general public.

Thus, the effect on the public interest would be deleterious if the Court declined to grant the requested injunctive relief, and this factor also weighs in favor of granting CHCC's request.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the balance of the four-factor test from *Tinian Shipping*— which includes likelihood of success on the merits, threat of irreparable harm to the moving party, the balance of hardships between the parties, and any effect the injunction may have on the

1 | p 2 | t 3 | p 4 | 0

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22.

23

24

public interest — weighs in favor of granting the requested injunctive relief. The Court also finds that at least three of the factors — threat of irreparable harm, balance of hardships, and effect on the public interest — weigh heavily in favor of granting the preliminary injunction against CUC. Otherwise, the first factor, likelihood of CHC's success on the merits of the underlying suit, is likely the weakest, yet it still weighs in favor of this Court's issuance of the preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, based upon the four-factor test from *Tinian Shipping*, the Court grants CHCC's request for a preliminary injunction against CUC preventing and prohibiting the utility from disconnecting any services for the remainder of the underlying suit.

E. <u>Alternative Test</u>

Alternatively, the court may issue a preliminary injunction if the moving party demonstrates either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or the existence of serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping in the moving party's favor. *Tinian Shipping*, 2005 at ¶ 20.

Thus, while the Court declines to find that CHCC has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying case, it does recognize that CHCC's Answer to CUC's complaint raises serious questions going to the merits of the case, as it would entertain the majority of the arguments made in CHCC's Answer and in the written materials submitted in this matter. Further, the Court also finds that the balance of the hardships tips sharply in CHCC's favor, as providing critical, irreplaceable, and potentially life-saving healthcare services to the people of the Commonwealth is infinitely more important than any financial interest of a public corporation.

Thus, even if the balance of the four-factor test does not weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunction, the above test enumerated in *Tinian Shipping* provides the Court with an alternate authority on which to base its issuance of the preliminary injunction. That is, the Court grants CHCC's request for a preliminary injunction against CUC based upon either test.

V. CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, the Court HEREBY GRANTS CHCC's request for injunctive relief and as such issues a Preliminary Injunction enjoining CUC from disconnecting any utility services provided to CHCC until any such further order dispensing with the underlying case.

As such, it is HEREBY ORDERED that CUC, its agents, assistants, employees, successors, and all other persons acting in concert or cooperation with it or under its control, are enjoined and prohibited from disconnecting any utility services CUC provides to CHCC, or with impeding or interfering in any manner with the provision of electric/water/sewer utility services to Defendant.

It is **FURTHER ORDERED** that CHCC shall continue to pay its current and monthly utility usage bills — not including late fees, interest, and penalties — for the remainder of the underlying suit or until ordered by this Court to do otherwise.

SO ORDERED this 20th day of January, 2015.

_____/ s /_ David A. Wiseman, Associate Judge