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PM 3: 33

FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

COMMONWEALTH OF THE	TRAFFIC CASE NO. 17-00814
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,	
)	ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
Plaintiff,	MOTION TO DISMISS AS A TRAFFIC
	CITATION DESIGNED FOR TRAFFIC
v.	VIOLATIONS, WHICH DOES NOT LIST
	THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
GREGORY FRANK TAITANO CASTRO)	VIOLATIONS, IS INSUFFICIENT TO
)	PUT THE DEFENDANT ON NOTICE OF
Defendant.)	THE CHARGES IN VIOLATION OF
)	DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUE
	PROCESS RIGHTS
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)	
)	
)	

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER came before the Court on July 10, 2017 in Courtroom 220A for a bench trial. The Defendant, Gregory Frank Taitano Castro, was present and represented by Attorney Rene Holmes. The Commonwealth was represented by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Wilberscheid.

The Court hereby makes the following order.

II. BACKGROUND

The Defendant is charged with violations of 1 CMC § 7406, Restriction Upon Use of Government Vehicles. Specifically, the traffic citation charges four offenses. First, the citation charges that the Defendant violated 1 CMC § 7406(d), which requires that government vehicles "are only to be used for official government business." Second, the citation charges that the

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¹ The Defendant's motion to reconsider was addressed in a separate order. *See Commonwealth v. Castro*, Tr. No. 17-00815 (NMI Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2017) (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider as Defendant Failed to Articulate the Legal Grounds for Reconsideration).

Defendant violated 1 CMC § 7406(e), which prohibits tinting the windows of some government vehicles. Third, the citation charges that the Defendant violated 1 CMC § 7406(f), which requires that government vehicles be marked. Finally, the citation charges the Defendant with 1 CMC § 7406(g)(1). Offenses contained within 1 CMC § 7406 are ethics violations.

On July 10, 2017, the morning of the bench trial, the Commonwealth provided discovery—specifically new interviews and investigation reports. The Commonwealth also moved to amend the citation, changing 1 CMC § 7406(g)(1) to 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2) during pretrial house-keeping. The Court granted the Commonwealth's motion over the Defendant's objection. The Defendant moved that the Court reconsider its order allowing the Commonwealth to amend the citation, changing 1 CMC § 7406(g)(1) to 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2). After the bench trial began and after the Commonwealth called its first witness and began direct examination of the witness, the Defendant made an oral motion to dismiss, arguing that the citation was insufficient to put him on notice of the charges against him.

On July 11, 2017, the Court heard additional arguments from the parties and ordered supplemental briefing on the sufficiency of the citation and whether the Court should reconsider it's order allowing the Commonwealth to amend the citation.

The Commonwealth filed its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and Reconsider on July 31, 2017. The Defendant also filed his Supplemental Briefing on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Dismiss the Citation on July 31, 2017.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

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The Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Traffic Cases apply in traffic cases. NMI R. Traff. 1.2 Traffic offenses are "any violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation relating to the operation or use of motor vehicles and any violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation relating to the use of streets and highways by pedestrians or by the operation of any other vehicle." NMI R. Traff. 2(1). The Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to traffic cases, since "[o]ther rules and laws which govern criminal procedure shall, insofar as they are applicable, implement the rules prescribed by these Rules." NMI R. Traff. 2. "The rules of traffic procedure are not, and were not intended to be, the sole authority in traffic-related cases." *Commonwealth v. Castro*, 2002 MP 13 ¶ 19. "[T]he rules of traffic procedure exist to supplement other applicable rules; when applying the applicable rules of criminal procedure . . . the rules of traffic procedure must also be followed."

"In traffic cases, the complaint or information and summons shall be in the form known as the 'Traffic Ticket, Complaint/Citation and Summons.'" NMI R. Traff. 3(a). Traffic cases may also be brought by information. *Commonwealth v. Babauta*, 2001 MP 10 ¶ 11. Under the Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[t]he information shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." NMI R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). The information must also "state for each count the citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged to have violated." NMI R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).

² Under Rule 13 of the Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Traffic Cases, the traffic rules are titled "Commonwealth Rules of Traffic Procedure" and should be cited as "Com. R. Traf. P." NMI R. Traff. 13. In the NMI Supreme Court Style Manual, issued in 2010, the traffic rules are titled the "Rules of Traffic Cases" and are to be cited as NMI R. Traff. For the sake of consistency going forward, since the current traffic rules under revision will likely be issued under the new citation format, the Court will cite these rules according to the NMI Supreme Court Style Manual. Similarly, the NMI Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be cited as "Com.R.Cr.P" in the rules themselves, but are to be cited as "NMI R. Crim. P." in the NMI Supreme Court Style Manual. NMI R. Crim. P. 59.

"Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground[s] for dismissal of the information . . . if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice." NMI R. Crim. P. 7(c)(3).

A citation, information, and indictment are different types of charging documents. A traffic citation is generally issued by law enforcement officers. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 221 (Abridged 9th Ed.). An information is generally issued by a prosecutor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 668 (Abridged 9th Ed.). An indictment is generally issued by a grand jury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (Abridged 9th Ed.).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Defendant argues that the citation, in its present form, is insufficient to put the Defendant on notice to the charges against him. The Court will first address whether the Defendant waived his objection to the citation by failing to object to the issue prior to trial. Then, the Court will address whether the citation itself is sufficient.

1. The Commonwealth's Untimely Discovery and Amendment of Charges is Cause to Allow the Defendant to Raise His Objection During Trial Pursuant to NMI R. Crim. P. 12(f).

As a threshold matter, the Court notes the Commonwealth's argument that the Defendant waived any objections to the citation by failing to raise them prior to trial. Under Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b), "[a]ny defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion." NMI R. Crim. P. 12(b) ("Rule 12(b)"). Rule 12(b) outlines a number of motions which must be made prior to trial, including "[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the complaint or information (other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or *to charge an offense* which objections shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings)." NMI

R. Crim. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Yoo, 2004 MP 5 \P 8 ("It is clear that objections to the form of an information, in this case a traffic citation, must be made prior to trial.")

If a defendant fails to make such a motion prior to trial, "the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver." NMI R. Crim. P. 12(f). "The decision whether to grant relief from waiver under Rule 12(f) lies in the discretion of the trial court, once good cause for such relief is shown." *Yoo*, 2004 MP 5 ¶ 11. In *Yoo*, the trial court dismissed a citation because the trial court was "concerned" that the DPS Officer who wrote the citation did not write the citation until five days after the alleged incident, despite the fact that the Defendant did not raise any objections to the citation until after the close of the Commonwealth's case in chief. 2004 MP 5 ¶¶ 5, 9. The trial court in *Yoo* dismissed the case after a guilty verdict had been entered. *Id*. ¶ 5. The Commonwealth Supreme Court ultimately overturned the trial court's dismissal, since challenges to the citation must be made prior to trial unless there is good cause shown, and the trial court's concern that the responding officer waited five days to issue the citation was not good cause. *Id*. ¶ 16.4

Here, the Defendant raised his motion during the trial, as the Commonwealth began its case in chief. The Commonwealth argues that the Defendant's late motion is a litigation tactic, and that there is no cause to allow the Defendant to make the motion after the trial has begun. The Commonwealth also argues that any objection given via a letter sent by the Defendant objecting to the citation prior to trial is insufficient since this objection was not filed with the Court. The Defendant argues that his due process rights cannot be trumped by the Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor by the Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Traffic Cases. Further,

³ In the civil context, a complaint is "[t]he initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court's

jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the demand for relief." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (Abridged 9th Ed.). In the criminal context, a complaint is "[a] formal charge accusing a person of an offense." *Id.*4 During the five days that elapsed between the incident and the issuance of the citation, the officer in *Yoo* continued his

During the five days that elapsed between the incident and the issuance of the citation, the officer in *Yoo* continued h investigation, which included interviewing the victim's father and speaking with the Attorney General's Office about the case. *Yoo*, 2004 MP 5 ¶ 4.

the Defendant points out that, unlike *Yoo*, where the trial court was concerned that the DPS Officer wrote Yoo's citation five days after the fact, here the Defendant is alleging that the whole citation is constitutionally improper as it fails to provide notice to the Defendant of the charges against him.

The Commonwealth provided some discovery a few days before trial and again on the morning of trial. The Commonwealth also waited until the morning of trial to move to amend the citation. The Commonwealth provided discovery on the eve of trial, then amended the charges on the morning of the bench trial, so it is unlikely that the Defendant would have had time to properly prepare his defense in light of the newly provided evidence and amended charges.

Further, the Court notes that the Commonwealth's amendment from 1 CMC § 7406(g)(1) to 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2) on the morning of trial changed the offense charged from a *non-offense* to an offense. Section 7406(g)(1) provides:

Only government license plates may be issued to government vehicles, and within one year of April 22, 1995, all government cars must bear government license plates, excepting only government cars that are leased for less than 60 days. A government license plate is one that clearly says "Government" or "Gov't," and that can easily be distinguished from an ordinary license plate.

1 CMC § 7406(g)(1). Section 7406(g)(1) does not outline a specific offense related to government license plates, nor does it impose a fine or term of imprisonment.

Section 7406(g)(2), on the other hand, outlines offenses related to government license plates as well as the related fines and terms of imprisonment. 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2). Section 7406(g)(2) actually defines *three* different offenses related to government license plates. *Id.* One possible offense outlined by Section 7406(g)(2) is: "After one year from April 22, 1995, any person driving, operating or using a government vehicle that does not bear government license plates shall be guilty of an infraction punishable by a fine of up to \$500, and/or three days imprisonment." 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2). A second possible offense outlined by Section 7406(g)(2) is: "Any person driving, operating or using a vehicle that is a government vehicle that does not bear government license

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plates shall be guilty of an infraction punishable by a fine of up to \$500, and/or three days imprisonment." *Id.* A third possible offense outlined by Section 7406(g)(2) is: "Any person driving, operating or using a vehicle that is not a government vehicle, but that does carry government plates, shall be guilty of an infraction punishable by a fine of up to \$500, and/or three days imprisonment; except, if the vehicle was transferred away from the government within the past 60 days." *Id.* Section 7406(g)(2) is significantly different from Section 7406(g)(1), which was not actually a crime at all. The Defendant must then defend against a charge that entails up to three possible offenses.

Due to the Commonwealth's failure to make timely discovery, the late hour of discovery, and the Commonwealth's motion to amend the citation from a non-violation to a code section with three possible offenses, the Court finds that there is good cause shown to allow the Defendant to raise this issue after the start of trial. NMI R. Crim. P. 12(f).

2. The Charging Document Must Contain Sufficient Information to Put the Defendant on Notice to the Charges Against Him.

The Defendant argues that the citation failed to put him on notice to the charges against him. The Defendant relied on *Hamling v. United States* while arguing that the traffic citation was insufficient to put him on notice to the charges against him. 418 U.S. 87, 117-118 (1974). *Hamling* outlined two constitutional requirements for a charging document: "first, [that it] contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, [that it] enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions of the same offense." *United States v. Resendiz-Ponce*, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (quoting *Hamling*, 418 U.S. at 117).

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words of the statute itself, as long as 'those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished." *Hamling*, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting *United States v. Carll*, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). If the "language of the statute" is used to define the offense, "it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged." *Id.* at 117-118 (quoting *States v. Hess*, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888)).

Under Hamling, "[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the

In *Hamling*, the indictment was sufficient where the petitioners were charged with an obscenity-related offense where the indictment failed to define "obscenity," since it is a "legal term of art." 418 U.S. at 118-119. According to *Hamling*, since obscenity is "a legal term of art" and "[t]he legal definition of obscenity does not change with each indictment; it is a term sufficiently definite in legal meaning to give a defendant notice of the charge against him." *Id.* at 118 (citing *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 491-492 (1957)). On the other hand, if a charge requires a "specific identification of fact," the indictment must "do more than simply repeat the language of the criminal statute." *Id.* (quoting *Russell v. United States*, 369 U.S. 749, 764 (1962)).⁵

"The Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] is satisfied when the information is specific enough to advise the defendant of the charge against him, to enable him to prepare for trial, and to plead the result in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offence." Babauta, 2001 MP 10 \P 12 (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764 (1962)). In

The petitioners in *Hamling* argued that their indictment, charging them with conspiring to mail obscene materials, was insufficient to put them on notice as to the charges against them. *Hamling*, 418 U.S. at 117. The Court notes that, since the petitioners in *Hamling* were charged with an obscenity related offense, the *Hamling* court addressed whether the definition of "obscenity" needed to be alleged in the indictment, ultimately holding that the indictment was sufficient without the definition of "obscenity" since it is a "legal term of art." *Id.* at 118-119. This is dissimilar to the present case, which is an ethics case alleging various misdemeanors related to a government vehicle.

Babauta, although the defendant was charged with traffic offenses, the charging document was an information rather than a traffic citation. *Id.* at ¶ 13. The defendant in *Babauta* was charged by information, which included "the language of each statute" as well as "the date of the offense and where the violation occurred." *Id.* ¶ 13.

"The Commonwealth is required to provide a defendant, through a combination of information and discovery, with 'the elements of the offenses with which he was charged, as well as the underlying facts supporting those charges." *Commonwealth v. Li*, Tr. No. 15-00616 (NMI Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2015) (Order Denying Commonwealth's Request for Leave to Amend Information as to Count II Since This Count Would Add a Multiplicitous Charge at 7) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Castro*, 2008 MP 18 ¶ 14). "The information may be taken together with discovery to provide both the elements and underlying facts." *Id.* (citing *Castro*, 2008 MP 18 ¶ 14).

a. The Charging Document Does Not Contain Elements of the Offense Charge and Thus Fails to Fairly Inform the Defendant of the Charges Against Which He Must Defend.

Traffic cases may be brought by either citation or information. *Babauta*, 2001 MP 10 ¶ 11. Under *Hamling*, "it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as 'those words themselves fully, directly, expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the *elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.*" *Hamling*, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting *Carll*, 105 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added)).

The traffic citation form used by the Department of Public Safety provides boxes to be checked off by the officer completing the form. These boxes indicate which traffic infractions were committed, such as whether the driver was driving in the wrong lane, or failed to signal, or was involved in a fatal accident. The citation form also allows the officer to indicate the road and weather conditions. The citation form does not provide check boxes or space for officers to include similar details for non-traffic offenses, such as alleged ethics violations like misuse of government

The offense of misuse of a government vehicle may be charged as a traffic offense, although it is more aptly described as an ethics violation under Title 1 of the Commonwealth Code. ⁶ On the traffic citation, there are no check boxes or space for additional details related to misuse of a government vehicle. In the citation in the present case, only the code sections alleged to have been violated are listed. The citation fails to allege any of the elements of the offense charged—instead, the citation merely cites the provisions violated. *See Citation*. The present citation also indicates the location of the alleged violation, as well as the date, and the identity of the Defendant. *Id.* In contrast, an Information generally provides far more information regarding the alleged offense, including restating the elements of the offense as listed in the statute.

In the present case, the citation form merely states the code sections alleged to have been violated, without providing any elements or facts. Thus, the citation is insufficient under *Hamling*. The Commonwealth argues that the Defendant may simply look up the code sections; however, solely providing the code sections with no additional information is insufficient to put the Defendant on notice to the charges against him. The Commonwealth is required to list both the offenses charged and their elements, not to merely list the offenses and expect the Defendant to guess the elements of the offenses. *Hamling*, 418 U.S. at 117.

The Commonwealth also argues that the citation may be supplemented by discovery to inform the Defendant of the missing facts, pointing to *Commonwealth v. Castro*, 2008 MP 18 ¶ 14.7 In *Commonwealth v. Castro*, the Commonwealth Supreme Court held that discovery could be read together with the charging document to fill gaps in the charging document. *Id.* In *Castro*, the

⁶ Traffic offenses are listed in Title 9 of the Commonwealth Code.

⁷ The full case name is *Commonwealth v. Joselito Castro*. The Defendant in that case is not to be confused with the Defendant in the present case, Gregory Frank Taitano Castro.

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defendant was charged by information, and the information "contained the language of the statutes he allegedly violated" as well as the date, the initials of the minor victim, and the allegation that the defendant "touched the girl's breast." Id. ¶ 14. Thus, although the discovery in Castro supplemented the charging document, the charging document still provided some basic facts, as well as repeated the statutory language of the offense, as required by *Hamling* and its progeny. *Id*.

While Castro demonstrates how timely discovery could supplement a charging document that has slight deficiencies, the Commonwealth overlooks that the Constitution's Due Process Clause requires that a certain bare minimum must be present in the charging document to enable the Defendant to find the information that would further clarify the charges against him while working through the discovery. Here, the charging document does not contain any elements of the offenses charged, nor does it allege any facts beyond the date, location, and identity of the Defendant.

Moreover, the Commonwealth failed to provide discovery in a timely manner, ultimately turning over new interviews and investigation reports on the morning of trial. While timely discovery could supplement a charging document that has slight deficiencies, a certain bare minimum must be present in the charging document to enable the Defendant to find the information that would further clarify the charges against him and sufficiently put him on notice when he reviews the discovery to prepare a complete and proper defense. Further, the Defendant must have discovery in time to sort through it and fill in any gaps in a deficient charging document, so that he will know what the charges will be at trial, as well as file any motions, interview witnesses, seek expert witnesses, and prepare for trial.

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Additionally, the Commonwealth has the burden to establish that notice was provided and, thus, that the discovery provided to the Defendant filled in missing elements of the citation. Here, the Commonwealth has made no offer of proof or argument to show how the discovery turned over to the Defendant provided the elements of the charges and/or the underlying facts that formed the basis of the charges; unlike Castro, where the discovery was alleged to include specific factual basis for the charges. 2008 MP 18 ¶ 14. There is nothing on the record to show that the insufficient citation was somehow supplemented by discovery sufficiently to put the Defendant on notice. 8 This is especially true for the charge under 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2), as there was no reference to 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2) by statutory words or any factual basis that would have given the Defendant notice to defend against any of the three possible crimes that fall under this charge until the very morning of trial. The citation in its present form is insufficient to put the Defendant on notice.

> b. The Charging Document Does Not Provide Sufficient Information to Enable Defendant to Plead an Acquittal or Conviction in Bar of Future Prosecutions of the Same Offense.

Second, the charging document must "[enable] him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions of the same offense." Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 108 (2007) (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117). This requirement is meant to protect the Defendant from double jeopardy, so that "in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction." United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (citations omitted).

As described above, the citation provides nothing more than the code sections alleged to have been violated, the date, location, and name of the Defendant. This, alone, is insufficient for the

⁸ In Commonwealth v. Li, this Court allowed the discovery to be used to fill gaps in the information. Commonwealth v. Li, Tr. No. 15-00616 (NMI Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2015) (Order Denying Commonwealth's Request for Leave to Amend Information as to Count II Since This Count Would Add a Multiplicitous Charge at 7) (citing Commonwealth v. Castro, 2008 MP 18 ¶ 14). In Li, the defendant was charged by information, which included a bare minimum that permitted timely-provided discovery to fill in gaps. *Id.* That is not the situation in the present case.

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Defendant to prepare his defense and protect himself from double jeopardy, as described above and required by *Hamling*. The citation lacks the necessary description of the elements of the offenses or any sort of factual background. Without any factual basis or any description of the elements of the charges against him, the Defendant could neither describe what specific conduct of his was tried under this charging document nor know how any subsequently charged offenses do or do not fall within the elements of the offenses charged in this document. Again, this is especially true for the charge under 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2) as there was no reference to 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2) either by statutory words, code number, or any factual basis to provide notice of this charge.

As a final note, "[e]rror in the citation or its omission shall not be ground[s] for dismissal of the information . . . if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice." NMI R. Crim. P. 7(c)(3). In *Yoo*, the Commonwealth Supreme Court stated that a responding officer waiting five days to issue a citation "did not mislead Defendant nor did it prejudice his defense." 2004 MP 5 ¶ 14. Here, the lack of notice prejudiced the Defendant by requiring him to essentially guess as to the charges against him.

To be abundantly clear: the issue is the failure to give the Defendant constitutionally required notice of the charges against him. The traffic citation, if it included the statutory offenses of 1 CMC § 7406(d), (e), (f), and (g)(2), as well as the elements and factual allegations may have put the Defendant on notice. Even viewed together with discovery, the traffic citation fails to put the Defendant on notice. The traffic citation merely lists the code sections and does not include any elements or factual basis that would allow the Defendant to know what his alleged conduct was or what the elements of the charged offenses were, especially in the case of 1 CMC § 7406(g)(2). The traffic citation, in its present form, provides insufficient notice for the Defendant to adequately prepare for trial. The Defendant is left to guess as to what part of discovery is relevant and essential

in preparing a defense. Further, there is nothing on the record showing that any discovery provided to the Defendant is sufficient to fill the gaps in such a deficient charging document.

Thus, the traffic citation provided in this case, which only lists the code section without providing elements or factual basis, is insufficient to put the Defendant on notice of the charges against him as required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. *Babauta*, 2001 MP 10 ¶ 12 (citing *Russell*, 369 U.S. at 763-764); U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. The United States Constitution and Commonwealth Constitution require that the citation be dismissed as deficient.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is **GRANTED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED this ay of August, 2017.

JOSEPH N. CAMACHO Associate Judge