CLERK OF COURT SUPERIOR COURT

FOR PUBLICATION

94 JAN 3 P2:00

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

SHINICHI TAKAHASHI,) CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-58
Plaintiff,)
v.) DECISION AND ORDER DENYING) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SHINJI INOUE,) DISCOVERY EXPENSES AND) ATTORNEY'S FEES
Defendant.	j

Defendant Shinji Inoue has filed a motion for discovery expenses and attorney's fees incurred during preparation for an aborted deposition meant to take place in Tokyo, Japan, on June 23rd, 1993. The Court has reviewed the memoranda and exhibits of both parties concerning this matter. On October 27, 1993, the Court also heard oral argument of both parties.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Takahashi wished to depose a non-party, Japanese citizen named Mr. Yoshizawa. Counsel for Plaintiff realized that the taking of such a deposition was governed by Commonwealth Rule

of Civil Procedure 28(b), and would ordinarily require a drawn out process involving a subpoena issued from a Japanese court and a deposition taken at the U.S. embassy in Japan. Upon Plaintiff's request, Defendant Inoue waived the Rule 28(b) procedure by agreeing to stipulate to Mr. Yoshizawa's voluntary appearance for his deposition in Japan. Both parties agreed not to sign the stipulation until Plaintiff could get Mr. Yoshizawa to commit to a particular place and time for the taking of his deposition. In addition to an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest, Mr. Yoshizawa has failed to pay a \$999,879.27 judgment issued by this court in a matter related to this case.

After one failed attempt to secure a deposition date on May 26, 1993, Mr. Yoshizawa told Mr. Takahashi that he would be able to appear for a deposition on June 23, 1993. On May 28th, both parties signed the written stipulation concerning the June 23rd deposition date. On June 17th, counsel for the Defendant received a phone call from Mrs. Nishigaya, Defendant's translator, regarding the possibility that Mr. Yoshizawa would not appear at the June 23rd deposition. When Defendant's counsel phoned Plaintiff's counsel to confirm this report, Plaintiff's counsel only stated that to his knowledge the report was false.

On Friday, June 18, attorneys for both parties traveled to Tokyo, Japan for the purpose of taking the deposition of Mr. Yoshizawa the following Wednesday. Later that day, Plaintiff met with his attorney and informed him that Mr. Yoshizawa might not appear. Counsel for Plaintiff made limited and fruitless efforts to contact Defendant's counsel with this information. On June 22nd, a telephone conversation between Mr. Takahashi and Mr.

deposition was further in doubt. Plaintiff contacted Defense counsel's Saipan office with this information. The deponent failed to appear on June 23rd. Defendant Inoue has filed a motion requesting this Court to order Plaintiff to pay \$7684.91 worth of Defendant's discovery expenses and attorney's fees pursuant to Commonwealth Rule of Civil Procedure 30(g)(1).

Yoshizawa revealed that the latter's appearance at the June 23rd

II. ISSUE

1) Whether Com.R.Civ.P. 30(g)(1) requires a plaintiff responsible for arranging the time and location of a foreign deposition involving a non-party deponent to guarantee the non-party deponent's appearance at the stipulated date of deposition?

2) Whether Com.R.Civ.P. 30(g)(1) requires a party giving notice of a deposition to inform the other party of an aborted deposition if the noticing party attends the deposition, and the non-party deponent causes the cancellation by failing to appear?

III. ANALYSIS

In the case at bar, the Defendant can only expect reimbursement for his discovery expenses and attorney's fees if:

(1) the Plaintiff breached an existing duty to insure the appearance of Mr. Yoshizawa at the June 23rd deposition; or (2) the Plaintiff breached an existing duty to inform the Defendant of Mr. Yoshizawa's failure to appear. In the memorandum in support of the motion for discovery expenses and attorney's fees, the Defendant relies on the language of Com.R.Civ.P. 30(g)(1) to

16 17

15

18

19

20 21

22

23

2425

2728

26

saddle the Plaintiff with the duty to ensure Mr. Yoshizawa's appearance at the deposition. The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff violated Rule 30(g)(1) by canceling the deposition without affording the Defendant proper notice. After a careful analysis of Rule 30(g)(1), this Court finds that the Plaintiff had no duty to ensure Mr. Yoshizawa's appearance at the June 23rd deposition. In addition, the Court finds that the plain language of Rule 30(q)(1) only burdens a noticing party (Plaintiff) with a duty to inform the party receiving notice (Defendant) of a canceled deposition when the noticing party fails to appear at the The Court finds that Plaintiff attended the place of deposition at 9:00 A.M. on June 23rd, 1993, and was prepared to proceed with the deposition. Therefore, this Court denies Defendant any recovery of discovery expenses and attorney's fees in connection with this matter.

First, Rule 30(g)(1) does not impose upon Plaintiff any duty to ensure Mr. Yoshizawa's appearance at the June 23rd deposition.

C.R.C.P. 30(g)(1) states:

If the party giving the notice of the taking of the deposition fails to attend and proceed therewith and another party attends in person or by attorney pursuant to notice, the Court may order the party giving the notice to pay such other party the reasonable expenses incurred by him and his attorney in attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Com.R.Civ.Proc. 30(g)(1).

When interpreting a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure such as Rule 30(g), the Court shall construe the rule liberally but should not expand it by disregarding plainly expressed limitations. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 85 S. Ct. 234 (1964). With this in mind, the Court construes Rule 30(g) as conferring a duty on the party

giving notice of the deposition either to be present at the deposition, or in the event that he cannot attend, to make sure the party that received notice of the deposition has also received timely notice that the deposition will not occur. <u>Id.</u> If the party arranging the deposition fails to attend and fails to notify the other party of the aborted deposition, the decision whether to impose discovery sanctions under Rule 30(g) is within the discretion of the Court. <u>Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.</u>, 709 F.2d 524, 532 (9th Cir.1983)

The facts of this case show that the Plaintiff arranged and gave notice of the deposition of Mr. Yoshizawa to be held during the morning of June 23, 1993 in Tokyo, Japan. Although Mr. Yoshizawa, a non-party deponent, failed to appear at the deposition, Plaintiff was at the place of deposition awaiting Mr. Yoshizawa's arrival. Thus, Plaintiff satisfied his duty to appear at the deposition he had arranged.

A careful reading of Rule 30(g)(1) reveals that the noticing party's duty to timely notify another party of the aborted deposition only arises "if" the noticing party has failed to attend and proceed with the deposition. In the case at bar, evidently the only participant not willing to attend the deposition was the deponent himself. Whether or not general rules of common decency required Mr. Takahashi to convey to Defendant a definite answer from Mr. Yoshizawa concerning his appearance on June 23rd, such a duty cannot be found in the plain language of Rule 30(g)(1).

Even if Rule 30(g)(1) were read to include a duty to inform the party receiving notice of a non-party deponent's failure to

attend a deposition, the Court finds that Plaintiff gave proper notice under the circumstances. The facts show that Plaintiff made a good faith effort to keep Defendant's counsel apprised of the non-party deponent's intentions to attend the deposition. The fact that Plaintiff went to great expense to fly his counsel to Tokyo for the deposition and actually appeared at the aborted deposition illustrates Plaintiff's sincere belief that Mr. Yoshizawa would make an appearance on June 23rd.

The Defendant seems to argue that the Mr. Takahashi had an additional responsibility to make sure that the non-party deponent appeared at the time of the deposition. However, neither the Defendant nor the Court have been able to find any case law to suggest that a party and their attorney are responsible for the actions of anyone but themselves during a legal proceeding.

Defendant's first source of authority, <u>Delozier v. First Nat.</u>

<u>Bank of Gatlinburg</u>, fits the Rule 30(g) scenario perfectly because the defendant gave notice of his own deposition and failed to show up for it. <u>Delozier</u>, 109 F.R.D. 161, 165 (E.D.Tenn. 1986). However, the <u>Delozier</u> case contains nothing to convince the Court that the noticing party is responsible for a non-party deponents appearance at deposition.

Defendant's second source of authority, <u>Pine Lakes Int.</u>

<u>Country Club v. Polo Ralph Lauren</u>, grants an award for expenses and attorney's fees when the party noticing the deposition fails to attend and neglects to deliver sufficient notice of cancellation to the other party. <u>Pine Lakes</u>, 127 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.Miss. 1989). However, the noticing party in the case at bar attended the place intended for the June 23rd deposition and

appeared to make an effort to keep the other party informed of Mr. Yoshizawa's intentions as the information became available to them.

As the facts illustrate, the Plaintiff was faced with the troublesome task of deposing a witness in a foreign country. Although C.R.C.P. 28(b) provides the proper methods for deposing such a witness, Plaintiff attempted to circumvent the admittedly cumbersome path set forth in Rule 28(b) by asking the Defendant if he would be willing to waive the requirements under C.R.C.P. 28(b) in favor of an expedited, voluntary appearance by Mr. Yoshizawa for his deposition in Japan. The Defendant agreed to stipulate to the waiver of Rule 28(b) on the condition that the Plaintiff get Mr. Yoshizawa to commit to a time and place for the taking of his deposition. By circumventing Rule 28(b) and attempting to take Mr. Yoshizawa's deposition without enlisting the power of the Japanese court system, both parties assumed the risk that Mr. Yoshizawa would not appear.

According to the facts, Mr. Yoshizawa had agreed to appear for the deposition on Thursday morning, June 23rd. However, attorney's for both parties flew to Tokyo as early as Saturday, June 18. The affidavit of Mr. Takahashi indicates that he first became worried about the deponents intentions not to appear on June 18 and relayed this information to his attorney upon his arrival in Tokyo. It is unfortunate that both parties felt it necessary to incur the expense of arriving in Tokyo five days prior to the deposition of a deponent known for his unreliability. Clearly, if both parties had made plans to leave for Tokyo at a time more proximate to the deposition date, Mr. Takahashi's would

have communicated his reservations about the deponent's appearance to his counsel while counsel for both parties were still in Saipan.

In any case, Plaintiff upheld his end of the stipulation agreement when Mr. Takahashi had gotten Mr. Yoshizawa to agree to appear at the June 23rd deposition. The stipulation agreement did not require Mr. Takahashi to guarantee Mr. Yoshizawa's appearance at the deposition. The stipulation agreement mentioned nothing about reimbursing Defendant for any expenses in the event Mr. Yoshizawa failed to appear. Absent any such language in the stipulation agreement, Plaintiff cannot be held responsible under Rule 30(g)(1) for the failure of a non-party deponent to attend the June 23rd deposition. Mr. Yoshizawa alone is responsible for his failure to attend the June 23rd deposition.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendant Shinji Inoue's motion for discovery expenses and attorney's fee's pursuant to Commonwealth Rule of Civil Procedure 30(g).

So ORDERED this _____ day of January, 1994.

ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Fresiding Judge