

1	II. FACTS		
2	On July 16, 1999, the Office of the Attorney General filed a criminal information charging		
	Defendant Guo Lin Zhang ("Defendant") with one count of promoting prostitution in the second		
	degree in violation of 6 CMC § 1344(a).		
	On October 6, 1999, Defendant filed the instant motion for jury trial contending that the		
	\$2,000 mandatory fee assessment provision as provided in Public Law 11-19 is actually a "fine"		
	which, when totaled with the original statutory \$1,000 fine in 6 CMC § 1346(c), exceeds the \$2,000		
	fine threshold for a right to jury trial under 7 CMC § 3 101.		
	III. ISSUES		
	1. Whether the \$2,000 mandatory fee assessment as provided under Public Law 11-19 can		
	be classified as a "fine" entitling Defendant to a jury trial?		
	IV. ANALYSIS		
	A. <u>Public Law 11-19</u>		
	7 CMC § 3 101, which provides the criteria for the right to a jury trial, states in pertinent part:		
	"Any person accused by information of committing a felony punishable by more than \$2,000 fine shall be entitled to a trial by jury of six persons."		
	6 CMC § 1346(c), as amended by Public Law 11-19 ¹ /, provides the following penalties for a		
	conviction of promoting prostitution in the 2^{nd} degree:		
	"Every person who is found guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree shall be subject to imprisonment for no more than five years or a fine of not more than $$1,000$ or both, for each violation. ²		
	Additionally, Public Law 11-19 amended 6 CMC § 1346 to provide a mandatory fee		
	assessment of \$2,000 for persons who are either convicted or given deferred sentences as a result of		
	being arrested for promoting prostitution. Public Law 11-19, § 6; 6 CMC 1346(e).		
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	¹ /Public Law 1 1 - 19 was enacted on July 9, 1998.		
	² /Prior to the amendment by Public Law 11-19, the penalties for promoting prostitution in the 2 nd degree were a maximum of five years imprisonment and a maximum fine of \$10,000. 6 CMC § 1346(b).		
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В.	<u>Fine</u>
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Defendant contends that he is entitled to a jury trial because the \$2,000 mandatory fee assessment under Public Law 11-19 is actually a "fine" whose amount, when combined with the original \$1,000 statutory fine, exceeds the \$2,000 jury trial threshold under 7 CMC § 3101.

5 Here, neither the term "fine" nor "fee" is defined in the Commonwealth Code. Therefore, 6 to resolve this issue the Court finds it appropriate to look to federal criminal statutes which impose similar assessments upon defendants convicted of certain crimes. One such example is 18 U.S.C. § 7 8 3013, which requires the court to impose a mandatory special assessment similar to that of Public Law 11-19 on defendants convicted of felonies and misdemeanors committed against the United States.^{3/} 9 10 Under this statute, it has been held that a special assessment levied upon a convicted defendant is not a "fine". United States v. Hurtado, 899 F.2d 371, 376 (5th Cir.1990). Therefore, in accord with the 11 Hurtado decision, the Court finds that the \$2,000 mandatory fee assessment under Public Law 11-19 12 13 is not a fine. As such, Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial under 7 CMC § 3101 since the maximum fine at issue is less than \$2,000. 14

V. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion for jury trial is **DENIED.**

So ORDERED this **<u>b</u>**⁹ day of November, 1999.

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 $^{^{26}}$ $^{3'}$ By comparison, the assessments levied under 18 U.S.C. § 3 101 are used to assist and compensate crime victims whereas the assessments under P.L. 1 1-1 9 are used to provide additional funding for the enforcement of anti-prostitution laws.